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Justifications for a Discontinuity Theory
of Language Evolution
Callum Hackett
In Chapter 6 of Biological Foundations of Language, Lenneberg argues against
continuity theories of language evolution, which claim that language
evolved from simpler communication systems. Although Lenneberg was
pessimistic about even discontinuity theories explaining how language
evolved, discontinuity has become significant in the Minimalist program,
which posits that our species’ acquisition of Merge was the key disconti-
nuity that made language possible. On the basis of a unified description
of natural communication systems, I show that language is indeed based
upon a cognitive discontinuity, which is moreover specific to linguistic
ability. However, I argue that evenMinimalist theories must recognise this
discontinuity as the sensorimotor interface with syntax, rather than syntax
itself. This ultimately supports the view that syntactic structures are struc-
tures of thought, but taking this claim seriously means reimagining how
syntax relates to semantics andmorphology, as the traditional ‘lexical item’
is no longer a tenable primitive of generative theory.
Keywords: continuity; communication systems; minimalism; syntax-
semantics interface
1. Introduction
One thing that makes language so fascinating—and its origins so difficult to pin
down—is that it is unprecedented in evolutionary history. This need not necessarily
make it mysterious or problematic, as uniqueness is simply a corollary of diversity,
which is plentiful in the natural world. It is therefore tempting to agree with Fitch,
who says that
the fact that humans [alone] have this particular capacity is nomore sur-
prising […] than other unusual features like the elephant’s trunk, bat
echolocation, or “radar” in electric fish. (Fitch 2010: 5)
Yet, the idiosyncrasies of other animals tend nonetheless to serve common biolog-
ical needs, like ingestion, navigation, and object manipulation, while human lan-
guage serves functions that no other species has been capable of, like creative and
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unbounded expression. These functions having moreover made civilization possi-
ble, it is the emergence of language—and not the elephant’s trunk—that Maynard
Smith & Szathmáry (1997) give as much weight to in their history of life as the ori-
gins of genes, eukaryotes and sexuality.
Of course, to talk of the origins of language, wemust bear in mind that it is an
integration of many traits with evolutionary histories that are largely independent
of language and independent of each other. Some of these traits—such as our vocal
physiology, motor control, imitative abilities, social intelligence, and so on—may
have been selectively refined for the roles that they now play in language, while
others may have been recruited by language mostly unchanged. Some may have
homologues in closely (or even distantly) related species, while others may only
have precursors in hominins, if any at all. Here I argue that, however this human
tapestry was woven, a sensorimotor interface with syntactically structured thought
is a core linguistic ability that is unique to humans, so the cognitive basis of language
must have originated within our lineage during the past six million years (the time
of our last common ancestor with chimpanzees; see Patterson et al. 2006).
Theories like this one, which claim that there is no evolutionary precedent
for language cognition, are often taken by their critics as claiming that language
was something that came from nothing (e.g., Deacon 2003, Lieberman 2015): Some
uniquely human capacity, whatever that is, must have been bolted onto our biol-
ogy by sheer good fortune, rather than having developed from it by any ordinary
means like adaptive selection. If this is howwe are to interpret ‘discontinuity’, then
I agree that we should reject it—the only genuine possibility for something to have
come from nothing is to be left to cosmologists. In life, all new traits, no matter how
unique or how quickly acquired, arise through the variation and selection that acts
upon existing organic material. In a very real sense, then, evolutionary discontinu-
ity must be construed as just a special case of continuity, and this paper will in part
explain how that can be sensibly done.
In section 2, I reformulate Lenneberg’s discussion of continuity and disconti-
nuity theories of language evolution, with a consideration for how the debate has
progressed in the fifty years since Biological Foundations of Language. Owing to some
deficiencies in the terms of that debate, in section 2.1 I introduce some clarifying
definitions. With those in place, in section 2.2 I adapt the notion of intentionality to
describe the necessary properties of all natural communication systems, and I dis-
cuss why the defining property of language—its mapping of words to meanings—
must be accounted for separately. I then consider whether there is any evidence for
this property or its potential in nonhuman species, and I conclude that there is not,
so languagemust be an evolutionary discontinuity. In section 2.3, I consider the sig-
nificance of this, and I demonstrate that there is no reason to think of discontinuities
as ‘miracles’.
Given the need for a discontinuity theory, in section 3 I investigate the role
of discontinuity in the Minimalist program. I begin in section 3.1 with Chomsky’s
standard conception, which I defend as generally plausible, though I argue that it
is on the whole unconvincing in its integration with all that we know about human
and nonhuman cognition. In section 3.2 I propose an alternativeMinimalist discon-
tinuity theory, which does not stipulate thatMerge is biologically recent and unique
to humans. I claim instead that the only evolutionary innovation in language was
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sensorimotor access to already available syntactic structures, which do not them-
selves provide linguistic ability. For this to be true, the input to Merge must be
purely conceptual, not lexical, and I sketch some support for this by considering
how syntactic and semantic structures might be maximally transparent. I end by
highlighting some broader programmatic issues.
2. Justifications for a Discontinuity Theory
2.1. The Terms of the Debate
Lenneberg does not give especially principled definitions of the terms ‘continuity’
and ‘discontinuity’, essentially because he adopts them for rhetorical reasons.1 At
the beginning of his discussion in chapter 6, he lists examples of animal noise-
making that have been considered primitive forms of communication and then
summarises the rationale underlying continuity theories in this way:
Since Darwin has shown that man is not the product of special creation
but that he descended from more primitive animal forms, neither his
structure nor his behavior are special creations. His forms of communi-
cation must have descended from primitive animal forms of communi-
cation, and a study of the latter is likely to disclose that there is indeed
a straight line of evolution of this feature. (Lenneberg 1967: 227–228)
After exposing several issues with these assumptions (developed in section
2.2), Lenneberg introduces the alternative of discontinuity in these highly subjective
terms:
A discontinuity theory is not the same as a special creation theory. No
biological phenomenon is without antecedents. The question is, “How
obvious are the antecedents of the human propensity for language?” It
is my opinion that they are not in the least obvious.
(Lenneberg 1967: 234)
Lenneberg did not need any more precise definitions than this, as his inten-
tion was simply to provoke a reassessment of the similarities between human and
nonhuman forms of communication. However, this paper will range beyond that
reassessment and we will benefit from some more thoroughly worked out termi-
nology.
Minimally, ‘continuity’ and ‘discontinuity’ ought to specify something to do
with how traits in different species are related to each other. As Lenneberg noted,
‘continuity’ has been used opportunistically for every kind of cross-species similar-
ity, nomatterwhether there is any underlying connection, such as a shared genetics.
This lax equivalence of continuitywith similarity effectivelymeans that any trait we
identify as similar to any other is a continuity, while any trait we identify as unique
to one species is a discontinuity.
1 Hewas aware of this and consequently sought to clarify his usage of these terms in the preface
to the Japanese translation (see the editorial of this special issue for brief discussion).
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Yet, this precludes the use of ‘continuity’ and ‘discontinuity’ in theories of
trait evolution, as a trait’s uniqueness is irrelevant to its origins and development.
A trait might be shared by two species purely because it has evolved more than
once through convergence, each time with a distinct genetic basis. In such cases,
the sharing of the trait is a mere coincidence having nothing to do with its genesis
and inheritance in any particular lineage. Just imagine that we wanted a theory of
human bipedalism, for example. By examining closely related species, we can infer
that the trait must have originated and developed in hominins, as it is a distinc-
tively hominin characteristic among the larger family of hominids (Richmond et al.
2001). To understand that hominin heritage, it would be useless for us to catalogue
instances of convergent bipedalism in, say, dinosaurs and birds, yet we would be
compelled to do so to establish the trait’s continuity, if its continuity is its similari-
ties.
Presuming that we do intend ‘continuity’ to specify trait relationships with
respect to their evolution, this means that the termmust be restricted at least to trait
similarities that have a shared origin, so that they are related by genealogy. Still,
even a shared origin is too coarse ameasure for addressing another key relationship
in evolution—the development of traits over time—as two traits having such a con-
nection is coincidental to their development through descent. Thus, while therewas
likely one origin for bipedalism in all bipedal hominins, the evolution of the trait
in the lineage that led to Homo sapiens was independent of its evolution in lineages
that were not ancestral to our species.
As an evolutionary term, then, ‘continuity’ is best limited to shared traits that
have shared origins and a shared line of descent. These qualifications have a very
straightforward expression:
(1) Continuity: The inheritance of a trait in an individual or population.
When a trait is inherited, it is passed on through descent, it extends from
one origin, and it resembles its antecedent, permitting some variation. All of the
apparent concerns of continuity are therefore contained in this one relationship,
while none can be improperly singled out. So far, this definition simply ensures that
any intuitions we have about continuity are made appropriate for an evolutionary
context, but there are some difficulties in applying it to the evolution of language.
Crucially, to determine the origins of language, we must determine to what
extent the various traits that make up linguistic ability have a continuous inheri-
tance, yet this is difficult to do by any direct means, as we have little understanding
of their genetics, they leave no environmental imprints, and their physical bases are
challenging to identify in whatever dregs of our ancestors the earth occasionally
preserves (Tattersall 2014). Instead, we can try to draw inferences about trait con-
tinuities by looking for homologues in other living species, with the cross-species
reach of a homologous trait giving an indication of how deep into history its con-
tinuity likely runs (i.e. as far back as the common ancestor of the most distantly
related species with the trait). But while this method is simple in its conception,
what homology is exactly has been debated and revised in recent biological theory,
so we must briefly examine the homology concept itself.
In line with the traditional notion, Mayr states that “ [a] feature in two or
more taxa is homologous when it is derived from the same (or corresponding) fea-
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ture of their common ancestor ” (Mayr 1982: 45). With respect to the definition of
continuity I gave in (1), the following is an equivalent restatement:
(2) Homology: The intersection of trait continuities.
If we know the continuities of two traits in two species, their intersection
would be their point of origin in a common ancestor, while having no intersec-
tion would indicate an independent evolution. It is implicit for Mayr (and explicit
for, e.g., Wake 1999) that this definition is unassailable, yet it has been challenged.
As observed by Butler & Saidel (2000), the homology relation is meant to allow us
to identify traits in different species as fundamentally the ‘same’, despite variation
in form and function, but this ‘sameness’ cannot be established absolutely. Pheno-
typic traits are constituted at a minimum of genes, developmental processes, and
morphology, with each level in this biological hierarchy having its own continuity,
so there is an inherent ambiguity in the continuity and homology of traits.
For example, when two distantly related species have traits that are only func-
tionally similar, with structural dissimilarities that do not share an origin, we gen-
erally categorise them as convergent. However, such traits can nonetheless share
deeply conserved genetic regulation, as is the case with eye development in verte-
brates and Drosophila flies—despite the profound differences between camera and
compound eyes, as well as the structures’ lack of common ancestry, they turn out
to be regulated by homologous Pax-6 genes (Callaerts et al. 1997; see Fitch 2011 for
the potential relevance of this phenomenon to language evolution). Also, many
anatomical structures across species that are clearly derived from a common ances-
tormaynonetheless be produced fromdifferent developmentalmechanisms, owing
to embryological epigenetics. This is the case withMeckel’s cartilage in vertebrates,
its formation being stimulated by different tissue interactions in amphibians, birds,
and mammals (Hall 1989).
In more closely related species, genetic mechanisms can have an unbroken
inheritance in several lineages and yet be expressed in morphology only sporadi-
cally, so that phylogenies can appear to exhibit multiple convergences that are in
fact genetic homologues (e.g., the nucleus rostrolateralis cell group found in some
fish brains, as discussed by Saidel & Butler 1997). Moreover, even unequivocal
instances of convergence might be best understood as arising from a common in-
heritance of design limitations, rather than from chance similarities in responses
to selective pressures, as the regularity of some analogues is too improbable to be
coincidence. Wake (1991) provides an example of this involving changes to digit
numbers in Plethodontidae salamanders.
Some biologists have tried to impose order upon this chaos of continuities
by introducing more fine-grained terms that apply at different levels of organisa-
tion (e.g., Butler & Saidel 2000), while others have sought to limit the domain of
homology entirely to one level, that of developmentally individualised structures
(e.g., Wagner 1989, Müller & Wagner 1996). This latter, so-called ‘biological’ ho-
mology concept treats many ordinarily analogous traits as homologous (such as
camera and compound eyes), and its advocates have criticised the traditional ho-
mology concept, which they label ‘historical’. But their criticisms, while valid, have
been levelled particularly at the prioritisation of genetic history above all else—the
basic temporal relation defined by (1) and (2), which does not specify any level of
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organisation, remains fundamental to every definition of homology that has been
proposed. Thus, we find in Wagner’s ‘biological’ homology a criticism of Mayr’s
‘historical’ conception and at the same time an inevitable resonance with it:
The homology concept is an attempt to identify and name the units of
phenotypic organization (i.e. those body parts that have historical continuity
and that can often be found in many species derived from a common ancestor).
(Wagner 2014: 44; emphasis added)
As in many terminological disputes, what we find advertised as a disagree-
ment on the substance of a concept is really a disagreement on howwe ought to use
a label to carve up a theoretical space. At heart, attempts to constrain the homology
concept to one level of organisation have been motivated by a desire to sift the am-
biguous continuities of traits for those that seem somehow more meaningful, while
an acceptance of a level-free homology concept is open to all kinds of observations
that are simply more or less informative (often hardly at all). As Wagner points out
(2014: 43f.), it would be fatuous for us to consider the continuity of a particular red
blood cell, as opposed to the system that generates red blood cells, but it is in the
end a matter for terminological hygiene (not biological theory) whether we rework
the homology concept so that fatuous applications of it are inexpressible, when we
could just as well choose to not apply it to fatuous cases.
The original, quick and dirty definition of homology therefore suffices, so
long as we are careful to refer to a level of organisation when using it (Bolker &
Raff 1996). If we are interested in the wings of bats and birds, for example, we
must identify them as homologous forelimbs, but not homologous wings, as the
common ancestor of bats and birds had forelimbs that were not wings (Dickinson
1995). Likewise, although we might expect to find conserved genetic mechanisms
for their development, these would be homologues of forelimb (not wing) construc-
tion. As I detail further in section 2.3, continuity and homology are always partial
in this way, so we must be sensitive to how traits integrate various interacting and
non-interacting levels.
To apply these refined notions of continuity and homology to language, we
must first observe a critical consequence of defining continuity as trait inheritance
(and therefore discontinuity as the lack of it): All trait evolution is predicated on
both continuity and discontinuity, and so all theories of trait evolution must like-
wise deal in both. A trait’s discontinuity is simply its origin or end, at which time it
must be created or eliminated rather than inherited, while its continuity is its stasis
or change through inheritance. Of course, few traits originate in a single transition
between generations or species, so we must not think of discontinuities as clean
breaks in evolutionary history. Nonetheless, all traits originate somehow and we
can call these origins ‘discontinuities’, whatever the details turn out to be. But how
does this definition, which brings continuity and discontinuity together in all trait
histories, relate to the debate on language evolution, which treats continuity and
discontinuity as opposites? For this, we need to be certain what we mean by ‘lan-
guage’.
The target that we all share is the species’ language faculty: A biological prop-
erty comprising all the anatomical and cognitive features that make it possible for
us to acquire and use languages, which are themselves individual, mind-internal
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systems (‘I-languages’, after Chomsky 1986) that provide some means of mapping
between sensorimotor expressions and conceptual content (i.e. sound and mean-
ing). In this context, I will use ‘ideas’ to refer exclusively to the kinds of thoughts
that I-languages access, and ‘utterances’ to refer to any, even non-linguistic senso-
rimotor expressions.
In principle, utterances and ideas need not be related at all. In humans, emo-
tive vocalisations, like laughter and crying, are utterances that do not stand for any
conceptual content, instead having only pragmatic interpretations, and it is clear
from our own internal lives that ideas can form and go unuttered (often for the bet-
ter). The same is true of other species—vocal productions in birds vary acoustically
with no matching variation in meaning, such as there is any (Catchpole & Slater
2008), and at least socially intelligent species seem capable of complex thoughtwith-
out having a capacity to express it (Cheney & Seyfarth 2008).
Whether there are any nonhuman thoughts that are the same in kind as the
ideas accessed by human I-languages is a more difficult issue that I return to in sec-
tion 3.2. Yet, regardless of whether language introduced a new kind of thought, it is
clear that the ubiquitous biological systems that are used to utter and to think exist
independently of language and are insufficient for it, so an organism can only have
language if it hasmechanisms formapping between these systems. This amounts to
a species-level equivalent of Chomsky’s (1965) distinction between competence and
performance: To have a language faculty, a species must have competence mecha-
nisms for doing the mapping between utterances and ideas, and performance sys-
tems for putting these mappings to use in actual utterances and ideas. As the fun-
damental property of language is the utterance-idea mapping, no matter what sub-
stance is mapped in particular individuals, I will refer to these competence mecha-
nisms as the mapping mechanisms.
This distinction between the performance systems and their mapping gives
theories of language evolution two histories to reconstruct. One is the history of how
the language faculty as a whole came to be as it is, with its particular integration of
all the traits that underlie it; the other is of how a language faculty became possi-
ble at all, through the first emergence of a mapping between utterances and ideas.
There was no doubt co-evolution, with the performance systems adapting to make
effective use of their mapping (e.g., with newly intricate control of vocal anatomy),
and likely contributing to utterance structure where it is under-determined by the
mappingmechanisms (e.g., Holmberg 2010). All the same, these are nuances rather
than counter-examples to the simple observation that language consists of things
that are mapped to each other and things that do the mapping.
With these qualified ideas of continuity, homology, mapping, and perfor-
mance, we can try to determine the continuity of the language faculty by search-
ing for homologues of the human performance systems and the mapping between
them. Given that homologues must be sought at particular levels of biological or-
ganisation, we are of course constrained by having little understanding of what
constitutes the language faculty at any levels besides cognition and behaviour, as
its genetic and neurological underpinnings remainmostly obscure. Moreover, what
we do know of language cognition is largely an inference from behaviour, which
underlies almost all syntactic theory in the guise of acceptability judgements (even
our own introspections are of course behavioural data, which we rightly try to ex-
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plain with theories of cognition, but which do not themselves reveal our cognitive
processes).
As far as nonhumanbehaviours are concerned, there are no other living species
that can learn and use languages, whatever talents some have to mimic fragments
of them, but we can’t infer any more from this than that there aren’t any homo-
logues of the entire language faculty, developed and integrated as it is in humans.
Although our particular configuration of performance systems and their mapping
must have originated in hominins, the date for the whole may not be the same as
for its parts—it could be that the performance systems have a pre-hominin history
and their mapping a hominin origin, or their mapping could be pre-hominin, with
the inability of other animals to use language being due to severe performance lim-
itations.
Setting aside polemic, both continuity and discontinuity theories recognise
hominin discontinuities in performance. The most obvious example is speech, for
which there are no homologues (there may be homologues of its genetic regulation,
but the behaviour and much of its neuroanatomy is uniquely human; see Lieber-
man 2007). Recall that all trait origins are by definition discontinuities, so all that
needs to be agreed upon for this is that speech arose in hominins. It should come
as no surprise that we all embrace a discontinuity of some sort, otherwise it would
be bewildering that humans have anything unique about them. However, even
where there are disagreements about the inheritance of performance traits, these
are unhelpful for categorising theories of language evolution more generally, as
such disagreements regard the inheritance of traits that could have evolved differ-
ently while leaving our fundamental capacity for language unaffected, and it is the
inheritance of that capacity that we are interested in. What matters instead, then,
is what theories have to say about the homologues (and concomitant continuity)
of the mapping between utterances and ideas, irrespective of the character of the
performance systems involved.
Continuity theories are those that find these homologues in abundance. Cor-
ballis (2017), for example, suggests that nonhuman great apes use manual utter-
ances to convey ideas, even though they are relatively imprecise and ambiguous.
Though these homologues are rudimentary, their prevalence suggests a long, pre-
hominin history of inheritance. Continuity theories do not deny that human lan-
guage has remarkable properties, but all are argued to result from changes to the
performance systems and their interactionswith general intelligence (syntactic struc-
ture, for example, is often dealt with as an epiphenomenon due to constraints on
learning and use; e.g., Hawkins 2004). It remains a truism that the utterance-idea
mapping must have had some discontinuous origin, but continuity theories bury it
deep in the histories of our species and others. Lieberman 2002 and Tomasello 2008
are other examples of continuity theories.
Discontinuity theories, meanwhile, go looking for nonhuman utterance-idea
mappings and come back empty-handed. All behaviours that have been candidates
are viewed as unconvincing abilities of some other sort, making it necessary to con-
clude thatmapping had a hominin origin. There is still a place for continuity in these
theories, as themany parts of the language faculty that are not unique to our species
must have pre-hominin histories of inheritance, and even the parts that are unique
have of course been continuous for the short time that they have been around. There
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is almost asmuch variation among discontinuity theories as there is among theories
of language cognition generally—Bickerton (2014), Bouchard (2013), and Jackend-
off (2002) all argue for discontinuities of very different kinds.
In terms of continuity, then, what distinguishes theories of language evo-
lution is the time that they propose for the origin of the human capacity to map
between utterances and ideas, as determined by searching for nonhuman homo-
logues. Either it originated in some pre-hominin ancestor, leaving many traces in
many species, or it originated in hominins, leaving no traces in any species but our
own (and possibly other extinct hominins). It has undoubtedly been misleading to
use ‘continuity’ and ‘discontinuity’ as labels for this distinction, as it does not regard
whether there was discontinuity, but rather when there was discontinuity of the rel-
evant kind. It is only because these theories have such radically different answers,
correlating with categorical claims about the existence or not of homologues, that
these labels have stuck as shorthand for what is really a division over pre- versus
post-hominin discontinuity.
Lenneberg (1969: 642) rightly warned that it would be futile to ever speculate
on the evolutionary circumstances that gifted ancient hominins with language. The
purpose of biolinguistics, informed though it must be by evolutionary theory, is not
to tell stories about our ancestors, but rather to tell stories about ourselves, by giving
answers to the sorts of straightforward engineering questions posed by Searle:
Subtract language from a species like us: What do you have? Now add
language: What are you adding? (Searle 2009: 178)
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the need for continuity and discontinuity in all
traits makes it meaningless to say that some traits evolve ‘continuously’ and others
‘discontinuously’. These are not terms that apply to evolutionary processes. It is
thereforewrong to think that continuity theories are gradualist theories, anddiscon-
tinuity theories saltational. Although these pairings have dominated mainstream
debate, the time of a trait’s origin is nonetheless independent of the mechanisms of
its evolution. There is certainly a connection between the amount of time a theory
allows for the evolution of a trait, the size of its phenotypic difference to be evolved,
and the mechanisms that might reasonably bring about that difference in that time,
but these are only implications to be explored. As such, many anti-generative theo-
ries, though gradualist, are also discontinuity theories (e.g., Deacon 1997), and there
are now some saltational generative theories that are continuity theories (see section
2.2).
Thus, if we are led to a discontinuity theory when answering Lenneberg’s
question, “howobvious are the antecedents of the humanpropensity for language?”,
we are not automatically committed to the belief that a gradual evolution of lan-
guage was impossible, or even unlikely. If we find that there are no obvious ho-
mologues of linguistic ability, this could suggest a sudden emergence of language’s
entire complexity, but it might turn out that language has antecedents that are sim-
ply not obvious, and which required only small discontinuities in hominins for the
language faculty as we have it to come into being. If so, its relatively recent origin
would be compatible with gradual evolutionary change. Before considering that
possibility, in the next section I consider the natures of linguistic and non-linguistic
communication to demonstrate the basic implausibility of continuity theories.
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2.2. A Theory of Communication
2.2.1. Giving and Taking Meaning
The major claim of continuity theories is that the human capacity to map between
utterances and ideas has homologues in other living species, so it has a continuous
inheritance extending further back than the first hominins (from here, I will frame
the debate in terms of whether these homologues exist, but readers should recall
from section 2.1 that this is a shorthand for whether the mapping is pre- or post-
hominin). As the utterance-idea mapping is the fundamental property of language,
continuity theories of course deny what I took to be a basic fact in my introduction,
which is that language is biologically unprecedented. For these theories, human
language really is just language as humans have it; it is only a hypertrophied form of
widespread communicative behaviours that are simpler, butwhich have essentially
the same mental basis.
Oneway to challenge continuity theories is to argue that the humanutterance-
idea mapping must be carried out by particular mechanisms, and that these mech-
anisms appear to be absent in other species. Generative theories in the Chomskyan
tradition typically do this by arguing that our performance systems are mapped by
a generative module that builds syntactic structures which each system must inter-
pret, so an absence of syntactic structure in utterancesmeans theymustn’t be gener-
ated by the kind of module that is necessary for utterances to map to ideas. There is
now a rich literature addressing the possibility for syntax in nonhumans, but most
studies have been undermined by shortcomings in experimental design (Watumull
et al. 2014), misinterpretations of data (ten Cate & Okanoya 2012), and a lack of
clarity on what we should even be looking for (Rogers & Pullum 2011). They are
further vexed by the systematic ambiguity with which ‘syntax’ is used to refer both
to any regularity in utterance sequencing (whatever its computational complexity)
and only regularities that match the particular complexity of human morpheme se-
quences. Nonetheless, while some nonhuman utterances (especially bird calls) do
seem to be generated by cognitive rule-systems, their syntax is never more complex
than that of human phonology, which has nomapping to ideas (Berwick et al. 2011).
Of course, it only follows directly from this that there is no nonhuman map-
ping between utterances and ideas if that mapping demands a syntax at least as
complex as the one that structures human morphemes. Certainly, a mapping like
ours, with hierarchical concept composition, requires a suitably powerful syntax,
but it is at least conceivable that a much simpler generative module could map be-
tween non-compositional utterances and non-composed concepts. If so, hominins
might have evolved only the syntactic complexity of language through some new
computational apparatus, rather than the utterance-idea mapping itself, and we
would require a continuity theory of language evolution. This is a latent possibility
in Minimalist theories like Hornstein 2009 and Boeckx 2015, where the emergence
of language is ascribed to computational discontinuities that are compatible with
(thoughdo notmandate) a continuity inmappingmechanisms (this is unlikeChom-
sky’s theory, where a computational discontinuity is the mapping mechanism; see
section 3.1).
Although these theories have much to recommend them, in what follows I
seek to establish that such syntactic discontinuities are unnecessary and burden-
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some to theories of language evolution, provided that a non-syntactic discontinuity
is inescapable and is alone sufficient to account for humanuniqueness. All the same,
readers should take amoment to appreciate the significance of these theories having
been developed at all. Generative linguists have ordinarily taken the evolutionary
discontinuity of language for granted, owing to the richness of language-specific
primitives that have seemed to be innate and which are transparently lacking in
nonhuman communication systems (such as the principles relating to case, binding,
argument structure, and so on). Now, however, some linguists have pursued the
Minimalist reduction of language-specific primitives to such extremes that they flirt
with the possibility of continuity, albeit a newkind, with continuity in the utterance-
idea mapping and rapid discontinuity in its structural complexity. Proponents of
this continuity Minimalism might object to it being considered a continuity theory
at all, as a discontinuity in the structure of utterances and thoughts wouldmake hu-
man language clearly distinct from all other animal communication systems. How-
ever, we have already seen that everyone acknowledges at least one discontinuity
in the performance systems, so our strength of feeling about some specific discon-
tinuity is irrelevant to its place in the overall debate about the origins of language.
We must always maintain a distinction between the history of the particularities of
our language faculty, and the history of the defining property of any language fac-
ulty, which is the utterance-idea mapping—any theory that couples a continuity in
that mapping with a discontinuity in its structure (or in anything else) can only be
identified as a continuity theory, though its proponents may set themselves apart
in other ways from gradualists.
Altogether, this new theoretical landscape makes arguing for discontinuity
much less trivial than it has often appeared, with many more consequences for
linguistic theory. For now, I will delay further discussion of what constitutes the
utterance-idea mapping in humans, as it will be more fatal to continuity theories
to reject them without having any particular theory of our human faculty in mind.
Instead, another means of challenging continuity theories—this one taken up by
Lenneberg—is to show that any discontinuity theory is preferable because all conti-
nuity theories are inherently implausible. This would be the case if either: (i) none
of the nonhuman utterance-idea mappings that are said to exist are of a type that
the human mapping could have evolved from, or (ii) there are no nonhuman map-
pings at all. Justifying this second, stronger claimwill be the focus for the rest of this
section (Lenneberg’s approach is quite different to the one I develop here, though I
consider the importance of that difference in section 2.3).
It is vital to recognisewhat identifying utterance-ideamappings in nonhuman
species demands. It is not enough to notice that an organism utters and thinks, or
that it utters when it thinks, or even that it reliably utters one thing when it has a
particular thought, as the mapping of utterances and ideas is more than their mere
coincidence. If I see a leopard and yell in fear, my yell will be related to ideas, in
that it will occur alongside my perception of danger and will allow others to infer
that a danger exists, but my yell will have no mapping to ideas, in that it would not
represent any of the ideas that it is related to. It might, for example, lead others to
think that there is a predator on their trail, that there is a person in need of help, or
that someone in a north-westerly direction is making an awful racket, but it would
not stand for any of these thoughts, or any of the concepts that they contain. A yell
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communicates simply that someone has yelled, with the association of yells and
heightened emotional states allowing a certain variety of useful inferences about
the yell’s possible causes.
This is totally unlike genuine utterance-ideamappings, such as theword ‘leop-
ard’ representing the concept LEOPARD in the expression of ideas that contain that
concept. Of course, the relation betweenwords and concepts is not straightforward.
It has been clear since Grice 1957, 1969 that the interpretation of linguistic utterances
is just as context-dependent as the interpretation of yells, as words do not denote
concepts in a one-to-one correspondence. Moreover, some have argued that this
is not just pervasive ambiguity, but rather that all words (as types) intrinsically
under-specify the ideas that they can refer to (as tokens) in contexts of use (there
is an interesting convergence on this point in both pragmatic and syntactic theo-
ries; see Recanati 2004 on the former and Borer 2013 on the latter). However, the
fundamental difference between something like a yell and something like the word
‘leopard’ is that, in context, only word-like things stand for concepts.
It might therefore seem that we ought to search for nonhuman utterance-idea
mappings by searching for nonhuman words, but this is ill-advised (if it is not sim-
ply tautology), as many of the properties that human words have in addition to
their idea-mapping are not necessary for that mapping. For example, I have al-
ready dismissed syntactic and semantic compositionality, just in case nonhuman
species have an unstructured, non-compositional mapping. We also cannot pre-
sume that meaningful units (i.e. morphemes) will decompose into strings of mean-
ingless ones (i.e. phonemes), as this ‘duality of patterning’ may be necessary for
large vocabularies of mappings (Nowak & Krakauer 1999), but it is not necessary
for small ones (Sandler et al. 2011 argue that Al-Sayyid Bedouin Sign Language has
no phonological patterning). Moreover, there are phonologically complex units,
like ‘hello’ and ‘abracadabra’, that are not syntactically compositional and do not
map to non-composed concepts, but which we nonetheless think of as words (no-
tice that human language seems to lack syntactically non-compositional words that
domap to concepts—I think this tells against the very possibility of it even in other
species, but I leave it as an open question).
As such, we can only consider whether utterances have a mapping to ideas,
ignoring all other incidental properties, but we face a difficulty here, as this is a
mind-internal property that we cannot observe. While we can probe the invisible
boundaries of our own linguistic capacity using circuitous introspective methods,
we obviously cannot do the same with nonhuman species. Thus, without access to
nonhuman minds, we are limited to a study of nonhuman behaviours, and so must
examine their utterances for literally superficial signs of an underlying mapping to
ideas. Yet, what visible features of utterances could possibly tell us that they have
this invisiblemental property? The classic inventory of utterance features isHockett
1960, and though none ofHockett’s features (as he defines them) is guaranteed of all
and only utterances with a mapping to ideas, en route to such a feature, it is crucial
to understand why it cannot be his most likely candidate: ‘Semanticity’.
There are really two ways that people think about ‘semantics’, only one of
which is sensible, though both are unhelpful to the task we are embarked upon.
Hockett defines ‘semanticity’ in terms of “relatively fixed associations between el-
ements in messages (e.g., words) and recurrent features or situations in the world
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around us.” This is an unabashed behaviourist definition, which may be attrac-
tive for locating semantics in things we can observe, but, like classic behaviourism,
these observables give no indication whatsoever of mind-internal properties. As
Hockett notes, it is semantic by this standard for gibbons to produce alarm calls in
alarming situations, though he stops short of recognising that such calls would still
be semantic by this standard even if produced with no conscious control, and with
no representation of conceptual content, just like my yell at the sight of a leopard.
All that this semantics requires is a reliable association between an utterance (e.g.,
a yell) and its contexts of production (e.g., nearby predators), so that hearers can re-
spond automatically (e.g., by running away), just as though they can recognise and
react to a concept-representing statement like, “there’s a predator!”
Hockett’s kind of semantics was rebirthed as ‘functional reference’ by Marler
et al. (1992), with their emphasis on functionalism suggesting that the term should
be agnostic about mind-internal properties. So it should be, but it’s important to
see that this is not because our knowledge of those properties is limited (though it
is), but because functional reference is just irrelevant to them. Primate vocalisations
have always been the troublesome case, as primates’ use of the vocal-auditory chan-
nel has a seductive familiarity that tempts us to treat their utterances as word-like,
when wemight treat them as yell-like if they were produced by humans (the classic
example being vervet monkey alarm calls, which vary with particular predators,
just as though they have words for each of them; Seyfarth et al. 1980). Luckily, we
needn’t take sides on this issue yet, as all we need to notice is that functional ref-
erence makes no distinction between words and yells, whatever alarm calls happen
to be more like—all it cares about is whether there is an observable association be-
tween an utterance and some salient element in its contexts of production, which is
true of many kinds of utterances that nobody even suspects to have a mapping to
ideas.
If we turn away fromprimate vocalisations, we find exactly this kind ofmean-
ingful association in avian courtship dances, where individuals interact with visual
scenes, rather than acoustic ones, to make the same sorts of contextually relevant
inferences. Of course, there is no suggestion that a dance might refer to a concept
in the dancer’s mind, so functional reference has no grip on the issue (see Wheeler
& Fischer 2012 for a detailed discussion of how permissive ‘functional reference’
is). In fact, all of this can be easily extended to non-biological phenomena, where
there are no minds producing utterances at all, let alone ones that might possibly
be producing utterances to represent concepts. Smoke clouds can be said to have
Hockett’s kind of semantics, as their fixed association with fire can be learned by an
organism, so that it can infer from any instance of smoke clouds that there must be
a fire somewhere. While the notion of functional reference might seem to exclude
these mindless cases, it does so only by stipulating an interest in evolved rather
than non-evolved associations and responses—it would otherwise construe mean-
ing identically in each scenario, and thus contributes nothing to our understanding
of meaning’s mental character.
Having said all this, it is difficult to finally dispatch behaviourist semantics
and its reincarnations, as it remains trivially true that a word can only represent
a concept by somehow coming into an association with it. Quine (1960) showed
that words having associations with observable features in the world is by itself
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hopelessly insufficient for determining a word’s meaning (see also Gleitman 1990
for a syntactic perspective), but it is at least a precondition for word meaning that
a word’s use should have some contiguity with the concept that it is meant to rep-
resent (i.e. for ‘leopard’ to come to mean LEOPARD, it is necessary, though in-
sufficient, for ‘leopard’ to be used alongside thoughts of LEOPARD). As such, as-
sociations must have some role in a theory of semantics, and therefore in a theory
of language origins, but only insofar as our interactions with smoke clouds have a
role. What is at issue in all this is only the capacity that some animals have to per-
ceive things as meaningful, rather than any capacity they may have for language in
particular, which is an entirely different, derived phenomenon.
To put this more concretely, consider the extremes of a smoke cloud com-
pared to some uttering of “there’s a fire.” In the right circumstances, both events
could be taken to mean THERE IS A FIRE (i.e. an observer could have that thought
as a consequence of observing the event), but only the linguistic utterance would
give the meaning that is taken from it—the smoke cloud is not produced in order
to specify the thought that the observer should have. What Hockett’s semantics
does is identify those associations that have a potential to be taken to mean some-
thing, and functional reference identifies those evolved behaviours that are in fact
taken to mean something, but neither notion addresses whether these meanings
are taken purely through observer inference, or through the meaning being given
by what the observer observes. Moreover, note that if a meaning is always some-
thing like an idea in the mind of an observer (we will explore other possibilities,
but the lesson here won’t change), then ‘given meaning’ is simply a reformulation
of the utterance-ideamapping, and as this is the defining property of language, lan-
guage is thus beyondHockett’s semantics and functional reference. These ideas are
not inadequate or wrong in theories of the nature and origins of language, they just
have nothing to say about language at all, despite their use of linguists’ jargon.
At this point, we can settle upon a conception of ‘semantics’ that is more sen-
sible. Presuming that we do not want to say that smoke clouds have semantics,
as this would empty the term of its purpose in a characterisation of language, we
must concede that having semantics is not the same thing as having meaning, as
smoke clouds can be meaningful. Semantics must therefore constitute some par-
ticular, limited contribution to meaning, in which case it could either be observers’
inferences, which determine the meanings that are not given by an observed event,
or it could be mappings to ideas, where the meanings are given. Of course, linguis-
tic theory already has well-worn terms for these things: Observers’ inferences are
the subject of pragmatics, and so semantics simply is the utterance-idea mapping
(that ‘semantics’ is therefore just another label for what we are trying to identify is
why this more sensible conception is also of no help).
It follows from this that the utterances that animals take to be meaningful
without there being any mapping to ideas ought to be classified as having prag-
matic meaning (and no semantics). That ‘pragmatics’ is not commonly used this
way is no doubt due to the false equivalence typically drawn between semantics
andmeaning, aswell as the to reputation that ‘pragmatics’ has for referring to some-
how peripheral, ineffable, and even socially complex aspects of meaning determi-
nation, rather than to the simple process of inference from observation. However,
as I will argue presently, post-Gricean, cognitive pragmatic frameworks (like Rele-
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vance Theory after Sperber & Wilson 1986) provide a robust basis, even if not fully
realised, for understanding pragmatics as inferential meaning wherever we find it
in the natural world, even in socially unintelligent and non-conscious interactions.
It’s worth bearing inmind here that, because linguistic utterances depend (like non-
linguistic ones) on pragmatics for their meaning, the ’utterance-idea mapping’ is
specifically the non-pragmatic element of linguistic meaning, as it is this alone that
distinguishes it from non-linguistic meaning (Carston 2002 has an insightful discus-
sion of these distinctions, though the finer details will not bother us here).
2.2.2. Communication Systems
There remains one other possibility for continued confusion that leads us now to
undertake a more formal analysis of the distinctive properties of language. While
we might be willing to accept that there can be meaning without semantics, and
therefore that wholly pragmatic meanings in animal interactions are no more in-
formative about the origins of language than wholly pragmatic meanings derived
from smoke clouds and other such cues, it nonetheless seems that there is a bound-
ary being crossed here: Even themostmindless animal interactions can be regarded
as communication. Naturally, the notion of communication, and its intimations of
information transfer, suggests something like the giving of meaning, even though
there is no question thatmost communicative behaviours do not have semantics as I
have described it. What we need in order to navigate the difficulties raised by these
intuitions is a principled description of the necessary properties of animal commu-
nication, which can allow us to appreciate where the utterance-idea mapping fits in
a grander evolutionary scheme.
Note that an essential premise of the description I will give is that there is no
such thing as metaphorical communication—if we feel that we are licensed to de-
scribe something as communicative, that is because it is, even if we are describing
a non-conscious interaction, like a poison dart frog dissuading a predator from eat-
ing it by having a vivid yellow colour that marks it as poisonous. For the moment,
I will focus particularly on what unifies non-linguistic communication, and I will
afterwards consider what must be added to form a minimal linguistic system.
Let’s begin by focusing on the simplest case of communication, where there
is one signaller and one receiver. Every instance of communication involves some
thing, which we’ll call the object, that the signaller wants the receiver to under-
stand (I will use such mentalistic language as ‘wanting’ and ‘understanding’ for
exposition, and will encompass non-conscious communication later, so the exposi-
tion should not be read as claiming a psychological reality for beliefs and desires
in nonhuman communication). There are two important limitations on objects in
communicative acts: An object must be something that the signaller and receiver
can perceive, and something that the signaller does perceive. To put this impres-
sionistically, a signaller can only communicate about something that both parties
can think about, and the signaller must be in some sense thinking about that thing
to communicate about it. Of course, by ‘perceive’, I mean something much broader
than sensory contact with an external reality, as humans are exquisitely capable of
talking about fictions, like fairies at the bottom of the garden, as well as about real
things that are abstract or not present to the senses. Instead, I take something to be
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perceptible so long as it can be thought about at all, and so something is perceived
when it is thought about, in which case, it is a percept (I deliberately avoid ‘conceive’
for this, so that we can later have a different understanding of ‘concepts’).
We can be more precise about this if we consider the property of intentional-
ity. For now, I don’t mean the term as it has generally been used in previous dis-
cussions of nonhuman communication, as there it often has only a common sense
meaning (i.e. that of volition and desire), or it refers only to a capacity to repre-
sent others’ beliefs, following Premack &Woodruff (1978) and Dennett (1983). This
latter sense preserves more of the philosophical meaning, but not quite enough of
it. Instead, we must begin with intentionality as it was revived by Brentano (1874),
and as explored by Searle (1983) and especially Dennett (1987). Quite simply, in-
tentionality is the property of mental states and events that are about something, or
directed towards something. Belief and desire are certainly the classic examples: If
I desire an apple pie, my desire is an intentional state in being directed at the pie. If
I believe that the pie is too hot, my belief is intentional in being about that particular
proposition. However, these states do not exhaust the possibilities—if I am scared
of clowns, my fear is an intentional state about clowns; if I am irritated by a fly,
well, you see how the story would go. With this in mind, to say that the object in a
communicative act must be a percept (i.e. that it must be something thought about)
is to say that it must be something that an intentional state is directed towards. This
is satisfactory for now, but we will later on break down this equivalence between
thinking-about and intentionality, and it is vital that we understand percepts exclu-
sively in terms of intentionality.
So far, so much stipulation, but why should any of this be true? It’s important
to appreciate that the physical reality that is external to an organism never enters
directly into communication any more than apple sauce gets smeared across my
brain when I think about it. However accurately or inaccurately our thoughts rep-
resent the world, all that we know of the world is what we perceive of it through
the prism of our biology, and everything that we can communicate about is deriva-
tive of this mental organisation of experience. Thus, when we communicate about
apple sauce, we really communicate about our mental representations of it, rather
than about the sticky stuff itself, and any suchmental representation is by definition
a percept when it is thought about. More generally, whenever we talk about having
any intentional disposition towards something, the disposition must be mediated
by a mental representation of the physical thing itself. As such, it is always that
mental representation that is the percept, and this is why communication must al-
ways be about things as we think of them, rather than about things as they actually
are (here lie the beginnings of a criticism of referential theories of meaning, which,
like Chomsky 2000, I reject).
For exactly the same reasons that a signaller’s object must be a mind-internal
percept, so a receiver’s understanding of the object must also be a mind-internal
percept (a receiver is also a biological entity that communicates in mental represen-
tations). Of course, these percepts are not publicly accessible—even when we are
in some sense thinking the same thing, we do not literally have the same thought,
as thoughts are fundamentally physical properties of individual brains—so the per-
cept that is the signaller’s object cannot be the same percept as the receiver’s under-
standing, whichmust instead have an independent existence in the receiver’s mind.
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This second percept introduces a second intentionality into the communicative dy-
namic, and we shall call it the interpretant in imitation of Charles Sanders Peirce’s
philosophy, which has many important points of contact with this discussion that I
won’t develop explicitly (see Short 2007 for an introduction to Peirce’s work). Note
that communication is not perfect, and there are always two perspectives on inter-
pretants: That of the signaller’s intendedmeaning, and that of the receiver’s actually
taken meaning (e.g., I might point to something on the windowsill, and you might
look through the window). As we are primarily interested in the mental basis and
content of utterances, the utterer’s desires are paramount here, so for us the ‘inter-
pretant’ is the percept in the receiver as the signaller wishes it to be.
So far, we have a signaller and a receiver who are synchronous in perceptual
abilities, and we have labels for the percepts that they have in a communicative
interaction. For example, if I want to communicate with you about some book, we
had both better be able to think about it, and, if we can, my thought of it will be the
object, and the thought that I want you to have of it, the interpretant. However, we
have not yet equipped signaller and receiver with a communicative competence,
so that an object can in fact be related to an interpretant. For this, the signaller
requires some kind of sign, such as an utterance, that can direct the receiver to have
the interpretant that the signaller desires, as would be the case if I directed you to
share my percept of some book by pointing at the book that my percept represents.
Here, the use of a sign embodies a third intentionality, involving the desire that the
signaller has towards provoking some particular interpretant. Now, if we have an
intentionality, wemust also have the percept that it is directed towards, butwemust
be careful here, as this percept is not quite the interpretant that the signaller desires.
I could want you to notice a stain on the carpet, perhaps, and yet do absolutely
nothing about that desire, in which case it would have no place in a story about
communication. Instead, if I decide to use a sign, it is because I know the sign is a
means of bringing about a response, so it is the whole complex of the sign and its
interpretant that is the percept of this desire.
Signs do not have their meaning intrinsically, so they must have a ground
that gives them some connection to their object. The grounds that are traditionally
recognised are iconicity (resemblance of sign and object), indexicality (existential
connection), and symbolism (arbitrary connection), with the three often mixed in
one sign (Short 2007). The details of this taxonomy are unimportant here, except
for the fact that all grounds acquire an additional property in communicative inter-
actions that it is worth keeping in mind. A non-communicative sign (e.g., a rash)
might be taken to represent its object (e.g., an illness) by being indexically linked
to it, such that the connection will hold independently of any specific instance of
the sign (rashes just signify illness generally by brute association, wherever we find
them). A communicative sign, however, must always be grounded with some ele-
ment of self-reference, in that its object is inevitably dependent upon a specific token
of the sign. With pointing, for example, though we all have a general plan for how
to interpret the gesture when we encounter it, it has no pre-determined object in-
dependent of its particular uses (there are as many objects as there are things you
can point at). This is true even for symbols, which need not be linguistic—culturally
variable handgestures for approval, for example, do not signify approval abstractly,
but rather approval as an attitude of the signaller (note that rashes do not signify
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illness as a property of their signaller, as there isn’t one—the rash is an effect of the
illness, not produced by the person who is ill). The reason that this self-reference
is necessary is simply that signs that are produced by signallers always have mind-
internal objects, and so they are always used to represent properties of their users.
With the object, interpretant, sign, and ground, we have enough in place for
many varieties ofmeaning, but not quite enough for communicatedmeaning. There
are many interactions in which an object and an interpretant are brought into a
relation by a sign, but which are not communicative. For example, I might have a
piece of music in mind that I want you to think about, and I could achieve this by
inconspicuously whistling its melodies while you’re nearby, without you realising
when you think of the piece that I intended you to think of it. Although you thus
perceive the object and I get my desired interpretant by whistling, the sign has not
beenmutually recognised for what it is. Similarly, I might go about whistling with no
intentions at all, and you might notice the whistling and interpret it as a sign of my
good mood, though I had no desire to communicate that state of mind (although
I could do just that if I whistled ostentatiously while kicking my heels). Thus, in
order for the use of a sign to constitute a communicative act, there must be mutual
recognition that the sign is intended to bring an object and an interpretant into a
relation (Iwill comment on the obvious connection this haswithGricean pragmatics
momentarily).
Here, we add yet further degrees of intentionality that we must be careful
with. First, recognition is itself an intentional state, directed at whatever it is that
is recognised. In this case, it is an intentional state in the receiver, directed at the
signaller’s use of the sign (i.e. it is recognition not only of what the sign means,
but of the sign being meant to mean what it means). Second, to ensure mutuality,
the signaller must have a desire for the receiver to recognise their sign as having
communicative purpose, and the percept here is thus the complex of the sign and
its recognition. As an example, if I point at something, in addition to noticing what
I am pointing at, you must recognise that I am in fact pointing, rather than merely
stretching out my arm, and in performing the action, I must want you to have that
recognition, as it aids the interpretant I intend.
In the description up to this point, we have encountered all of the elements
that we need. To recap, we have five intentional states, each directed at one or
more of the object, the interpretant, and the sign (and it is the relations among these
that collectively determine the sign’s ground). Of the intentional states, two are
simply the perceptions of the object and interpretant, respectively; the third is a
signaller’s desire directed at use of a sign to bring about its interpretant; the fourth
is a receiver’s recognition of this desire for the sign and its interpretant; and the
fifth is the signaller’s desire for this purpose in the sign to be so recognised. There
are many interdependent elements to juggle in this account, and they are easily
confused, but all can be arranged into a more palatable definition:
(3) Communication: Use of a sign to produce an interpretant throughmutual recog-
nition of the sign as grounded to an object.
Human non-linguistic communication lends itself most readily to description
in these terms. For example, if I communicate to you that someone else’s cat is
crouching in the garden again by looking wide-eyed from you to the patio door, a
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fuller description we could give of this is that I use a facial gesture to produce (in
you) a percept of the cat through mutual recognition of the gesture as standing (in-
dexically) for (my) percept of the cat. My claim, however, is that this definition, with
one important adjustment, can extend to all possible varieties of communication in
the natural world, including those where all of the elements in the communicative
act are non-conscious.
Returning to an earlier example, we essentially have to askwhat it couldmean
for a poison dart frog to have communicative desires that it fulfils by signalling a
property of itself. Although intentionality was originally believed by Brentano to
be the hallmark of mental phenomena, it is not difficult to extend it to non-mental
phenomena if we adopt the intentional stance advocated by Dennett (1971). We
already do exactly this when we think, say, that a frog wants to make its poisonous-
ness known in order to be avoided, and there are reasons why this doesn’t seem
so ridiculous, even though we don’t believe that frogs have desires in the sense
that humans do. To adopt the intentional stance towards a system (such as an or-
ganism, or even a computer) is to describe it as having beliefs and desires, with a
view to predicting its behaviour. Thus, when we say that a frog wants to make its
poisonousness known, we can predict the development of a sign to represent that
property as a fulfilment of its desire.
Unsurprisingly, there has been considerable controversy about the adequacy
of using these anthropomorphic descriptions for non-conscious systems, as well
as about whether human beliefs and desires might in fact reduce entirely to non-
conscious equivalents (see Dennett 1987 and Ross et al. 2000 for more discussion).
However, the purpose of the intentional stance is not to make claims about the re-
ality of beliefs and desires as psychological states, but rather to predict behaviours
through the idiomatic ascription of such states, when this may be the best (and even
only) means of understanding behaviour. In this context, we can adopt the stance
just instrumentally, without concern for its metaphysics, and we need only think
about organic systems.
The critical point is that it is in the nature of evolution by natural selection
to produce organisms that can all be characterised as intentional systems. It is fun-
damental to the selective process that it favours those organisms that survive and
reproduce, and it favours those that do so most effectively (note that the ubiqui-
tous talk of natural selection as ‘favouring’ anything at all treats it as an intentional
system), so all organisms that exist can be fruitfully described as having a desire to
survive and reproduce, as well as beliefs about how best to go about it. Thus, it is
not so startling to say that a poison dart frog wants to communicate its poisonous-
ness because it believes that doing so will keep predators away, as this is just one
way of employing certain vocabulary to talk about targets of natural selection. Of
course, we still have all our work cut out for us in ensuring that the traits we talk
about are so targeted, but, if they are, the intentional stance applies automatically
as a consequence. One way of viewing this is to say that any attribute an organism
has that it would want to have in aid of its fitness, if it could think about it that way,
should be regarded as a percept of its survival intentions. Perhaps a less awkward
way of thinking about this is simply to say that any adapted property of a species
is a percept of selective intentions, and it is thus natural selection, rather than the
frog, that perceives the benefits of the frog being yellow.
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With this expanded notion of intentionality, we can understand percepts ei-
ther as things thought about, or as targets of natural selection. This imposes some
important limits on what might otherwise seem to be an unconstrained metaphor,
in that our definition of communication requires its elements to be percepts, so if
a property of an organism is neither a thought or an adaptation, then we should
expect that it cannot enter into communicative acts. This moreover means that non-
human communication cannot be distinguished from human language by thinking
of the former as being externally referential, as the only things that nonhumans can
communicate are things that are relevant to their fitness and are thus percepts of
natural selection—there cannot be referential meaning, human or otherwise. Bear-
ing all this in mind, we need not alter the definition of communication in (3) to
have it apply to non-conscious varieties—all we have to do is be clear that the five
intentionalities could be either psychological or selective. Compare the following
descriptions of communicative interactions, for example:
(4) a. Use of a facial gesture to produce a mental percept of a cat through mutual
mental recognition of the gesture as grounded to a mental percept of the
cat.
b. Selection of yellowness to produce selection of predator avoidance through
mutual selected recognition of the yellowness as grounded to a selected
property of poisonousness.
The parallelism is exact evenwith regards tomutual recognition, aswewould
discount as non-communicative any interactions where a trait has a signification
that evolution did not intend it to have (e.g., when the size of an animal is taken as
a deterrent, though that is not its evolved purpose). In the intentional idiom, a frog’s
colour is rightly regarded as communicative because it is meant to be recognised as
representing its poisonousness, and it is recognised as such, as evidenced by the
avoidance response.
Before seeing where this leaves us with language, we should appreciate quite
how general this account of communication is, given my claim that it can apply to
any communicative system. There is in fact no element of this description that is
novel, though it brings together several different perspectives. The triadic concep-
tion of the sign, object, and interpretant is of course Peirce’s (though Peirce would
have rejected such thorough mind-internalism), but, though the triad is excellent
for capturing taken meaning generally, it is only by making all three elements in-
tentional percepts that we limn communicated meaning especially. Of course, my
particular use of intentionality is Dennett’s, whose (1983) discussion of nonhuman
intentionality was heavily influenced by Grice, though he construed Grice’s ap-
proach more in terms of theory of mind than in terms of necessary elements in a
communicative dynamic. More important than Grice’s approach, however, is its
development into the definition of ostensive-inferential communication in Sperber
& Wilson 1986:
(5) Ostensive-Inferential Communication: The communicator produces a stimulus
whichmakes itmutuallymanifest to communicator and audience that the com-
municator intends, by means of this stimulus, to make manifest or more man-
ifest to the audience a set of assumptions I.
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It is by deliberate design that every aspect of this definition has a correspon-
dent in the definition of communication I gave, with the exception of the ground,
which is an important but often overlooked interaction of the other elements. In
translation, the stimulus is the sign, the set of assumptions is the object, their de-
sired manifestness is the interpretant, and that manifestness is mutual. The defini-
tion also has a correlate of the signaller’s desire towards the sign and interpretant
complex (Sperber & Wilson call this the ‘informative intent’), as well as to the sig-
naller’s desire towards the sign and its recognition (what they call the ‘communica-
tive intent’). The five intentionalities are all here, categorised in the same way, with
no more and no less. The only limitation of this definition of ostensive-inferential
communication is that it treats human interactions as possibly a special case, de-
pendent upon the subtleties of our social intelligence. Not so—this simply is com-
munication as it must be, and its ostensive-inferential character is simply the result
of the informative and communicative intents being realised mentally, rather than
selectively. Compare this with a completely different definition of communication,
that of animal signalling given by Maynard Smith & Harper (2003):
(6) Signal: Any act or structure which alters the behaviour of other organisms,
which evolved because of that effect, and which is effective because the re-
ceiver’s response has also evolved.
Note first that the inclusion of ‘structure’ here allows physical traits, like skin
colour, to be signals, which is what we allow by making it possible for signs to be
percepts of natural selection. In this definition, we find that the sign corresponds
to the act or structure, the interpretant to the altered behaviour, and the mutual
recognition of the sign to the necessary co-evolution of signal and response. There
are things missing in this definition, but they are all implicitly necessary—a sig-
nal can only have some effect on another organism if it has an object (or it would
be meaningless), which it is grounded to (this relation being what underlies the
well-studied problem of honest signalling; see Higham 2014 for a recent overview).
Maynard Smith & Harper also circumscribe the intentionalities for an interpretant
and for recognition by contrasting signals with other kinds of interactions: ‘Cues’
are thosewhere the trait has a signification it has not evolved to have (i.e. there is no
intention for the interpretant), and ‘coercion’ is where a response is forced without
communicative engagement (i.e. there is no intention for recognition).
These approaches to communicated meaning appear very different on the
surface as theywere designed to deal with very different phenomena, but I find that
they all present facets of one underlying dynamic that could be no other way. Once
we properly identify the five intentionalities of communication and the various in-
teractions of their percepts, we can abstract from their particular psychological or
selective character in particular acts and species, and thereby account for every va-
riety of communication in one like manner.
2.2.3. Language is More than Communication
Recall that, to establish the discontinuity of language, we must establish the non-
existence of the utterance-ideamapping in nonhuman species. Our account of com-
munication now allows us to ask more pointedly how utterance-idea mappings fit
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in the overall scheme of utterances relating to ideas. Consider, then, the differ-
ence between our poison dart frog, and, say, one person uttering to another, “it’s
poisonous”, to dissuade them from eating a death-cap mushroom. What are the
differences, and which (if any) are especially linguistic?
The most immediately obvious difference is the mental, rather than selective,
nature of the intentions in the communicative act. If language were selective like a
frog’s colour, we would all be born speaking the same words, and speaking them
automatically in the same situations. Fully selective vocal utterances are in factwhat
yells are: Selected calls that produce selected alertness in conspecifics through mu-
tual selected recognition of the calls as grounded to a selected property of panic.
Note how the fact that yells only relate to, rather than represent, ideas is partly cap-
tured in this by their objects and interpretants being affective states of the signallers
and receivers; any ideas that the receivers have are inferences from this affective
stimulation, which are not given by the sign.
We must therefore recognise the intentions in linguistic communication as
mental, but which ones? So far, I have only discussed cases where all of the in-
tentions are in harmony, but they need not be. For example, it is possible to make
conscious mental use of a sign as standing for a selected object, to produce a selected
interpretant. If I voluntarily fall about in tears (it being an act, rather than a phys-
iological response), it will be to produce sympathy (a selected response to crying)
through mutual selected (i.e. programmed) recognition of the crying as grounded
towards an unhappy state ofmind (states ofmindwithout percepts also being prod-
ucts of organic design). We therefore have to ask whether all, or only some, of the
intentions must be mental for utterance-idea mappings. It is certain that the object
and interpretantmust be, asmappings are always from and tomeaning. Evenwhen
an intended interpretant is a behaviour, as in an imperative, it is always targeted
indirectly through perception of the mental content specified by the utterance. It
is also necessary that the signaller’s intention towards the sign and its interpretant
is mental, as not having this mental intention would mean that the sign must be
produced automatically, while linguistic utterances are voluntary.
The receiver’s recognition, and the signaller’s intention for it, are similarly
clear-cut, though they aremore nuanced. If therewere a one-to-one correspondence
between utterances and the ideas they refer to (i.e. if language were entirely unam-
biguous), then the receiver would not need to know of the signaller’s intentions
towards the sign and its interpretant, as each interpretant could be derived without
any understanding of the signaller’s psychology. However, this is nowhere close
to reality—language is deeply ambiguous and, as previously discussed, pragmatic
enrichment of utterances is an all-pervasive necessity, so there is no possibility for
language unless a receiver has some mental recognition of the purpose to which a
signaller is putting their utterance, and the signaller likewise intends this recogni-
tion. Unlike non-linguistic and non-conscious communication, any communication
with a mapping of utterances and ideas therefore requires all the intentional com-
ponents to be mental in character.
We reach an important juncture here, as a lesson we learn from this is that
mutual recognition of communicative intentions (i.e. ostensive-inference) is a bi-
ological precondition for utterance-idea mappings. This mutual understanding of
intentions is the property of ‘shared intentionality’ analysed by Tomasello et al.
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(2005), and it is generally agreed to be a human development of theory of mind.
In other words, we are all implicitly or explicitly in agreement that a precondition
for utterance-idea mappings is not met by nonhuman species, so they cannot pos-
sibly have such mappings. The few scholars who suggest otherwise (e.g., Corballis
2017) largely focus on the gestural repertoires of other great apes, which are ‘inten-
tional’ in the sense of being voluntary, but there is no evidence that they have shared
intentionality (Byrne et al. 2017). Instead, apes gesture mostly unsuccessfully and
repetitively until some behavioural goal is achieved, as their actions are structured
to give cues for physical responses, rather than to communicate mental percepts
(this is true whether they are interacting with conspecifics or humans). They realise
that conspecifics are agents with abilities to satisfy desires, and they may even un-
derstand that others have beliefs and desires of their own, but they do not cognize
that an individual’s beliefs could be about another’s, so they lack the leverage of
shared intentionality to exchange mental content (note that their interactions can
be described as communicative despite not having shared intentionality, as mutual
recognition is still instantiated by natural selection, the gestures and their responses
being innate). As See (2014) observes, even if we are generous about primate vo-
calisations, interpreting those as volitional and goal-directed rather than automatic
and non-conscious, they would also have the same intentional limitations.
In a moment, I will describe a visible property of utterances that we could
use to identify them as mapping to ideas, but so long as we accept the uncontrover-
sial point that only humans have shared intentionality, we have already ruled out
nonhumanmappings as an impossibility. Why is it, then, that we are not all discon-
tinuity theorists? Well, we are interested in somethingmore precise thanmappings
themselves—we are interested in the cognitivemechanisms that facilitate the devel-
opment ofmappings in the right circumstances. We know that shared intentionality
is not itself this mechanism, as there is shared intentionality in much non-linguistic
communication (i.e. communication that is all pragmatics and no semantics). Con-
tinuity theories are therefore those that claim that the mechanism that facilitates the
association of utterances and ideas pre-exists shared intentionality, and the evolu-
tion of shared intentionality led inevitably to utterance-idea mappings through a
drift to abstract linguistic signs (e.g., Tomasello 2008 and Scott-Phillips 2014).
Stating this in some other equivalent termsmay set some alarmbells clanging:
Continuity theories are those that claim that the mechanism underlying utterances’
mappings to semantics pre-exists shared intentionality, and the evolution of shared
intentionality led inevitably to semantics, as just a highly derived form of pragmatics.
Discontinuity theories maintain a categorical difference between pragmatics and
semantics, and claim instead that the mechanism for semantic mappings came after
shared intentionality and is distinct from it. We therefore need to consider whether
this categorical distinction is justified.
We have a framework in place for the meanings involved in pragmatic com-
munication: They are mental or selected percepts, and, as semantic meanings are
never selected meanings, we need only be concerned with mental ones. These per-
cepts are individual in two very important respects. First, they are mental repre-
sentations of individuated perceptible entities, whether real or fictional. For ex-
ample, I can think about and point at some particular chair, but I cannot gesture
non-linguistically at CHAIR, the abstraction of all things that can count as some
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kind of chair. These meanings are also individual in the sense of their grounds be-
ing self-referential—the chair that I point at can only be identified as the object of
my pointing by recognising my signaller’s intention and following the line of my
arm.
Utterances with semantics are also partially individual, as they all require
pragmatic interpretation. It is the purpose of any linguistic utterance, like many
non-linguistic ones, to specify an individuated mental percept, and this requires
an amount of self-reference for ambiguity resolution. However, the essence of ut-
terance semantics is what is general, rather than individual. Although I have no
non-linguistic gesture for CHAIR, I have a word for it, and I have words for all
kinds of properties that cross-cut individuated mental representations—how could
one non-linguistically gesture at the colour of a wall, or at the exact number of a
heap of stones without counting them out individually? All of these things are con-
cepts rather than percepts, and it seems that concepts cannot be percepts, in that we
cannot bring concepts before our mental attention. Although we may try to think
of our concept BIRD, say, what we will think about is some particular prototypical
bird standing for the properties that our concept organises, though that prototype
cannot be the concept itself (see Armstrong et al. 1983, Connolly et al. 2007). We
cannot have a mental perception of the concept as it subsumes everything from the
peewit to the penguin, and if we otherwise tried to describe it, we would resort to
using other words for other concepts as periphrastic definitions. Concepts are thus
like ‘filenames’ that organise our thoughts (Fodor 2008), but the only things we can
actually think about, in intentional terms, are perceptible file contents.
While the individuality of pragmatic communication requires the ground of
a sign to refer to a signaller, the generality of semantic communication allows non-
self-referential grounds, as concepts are not specific to individuals—concepts are
relations among percepts, and though such relations must have individual neural
instantiations, they are also abstractions over individuals, in just the same way that
we must all have different neural instantiations of structurally identical sentences.
We can therefore identify utterances with semantics by observingwhether their use
has a non-self-referential ground (i.e. an independence of signallers’ communica-
tive intentions). Of course, this is impossible to observewith any single utterance, as
all utterances have a pragmatic element, but if we look at patterns of use, semantic
utterances ought not to be correlated with characteristic intentions for recognition
and interpretation:
(7) Non-Self-Referential Grounding: Utterances that map to ideas can be identified
by a pattern of use that is independent of particular communicative intentions
on occasions of use.
This applies quite neatly to humans, as we can use it to distinguish words
that do and do not have a mapping to ideas. For example, ‘hello’, which is not
syntactically or semantically compositional, is strongly correlated with a specific
intention to be recognised as signalling a greeting. Take semantically contentful
words, however, and they have no strong correlation with specific intentions (we
put other words to use for all kinds of different purposes). In case we are not con-
vinced of other species’ deficiency in shared intentionality, we can instead observe
that none of their utterances exhibit this patterning—the most advanced vocal and
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manual gestures in closely related primate species are all directed towards specific
communicative goals, and are thus fully pragmatic. This evokes some of the old
arguments against behaviourism, the first page of Fodor 1975 stating:
the contribution of [an] organism’s internal states to the causation of
its own behavior seems sufficiently undisputable, given the spontane-
ity and freedom from local environmental control that behavior often
exhibits. (Fodor 1975: 1)
Here, we could just as well say that an organism’s internal mapping of utterances
to ideas is sufficiently undisputable when the utterances have a spontaneity and
freedom from local environmental control.
This much establishes that semantic and pragmatic meanings are mentally
different in kind, but mightn’t shared intentionality nonetheless be sufficient for
both, as continuity theories claim? There are two points to consider here. In a se-
mantically compositional system, where composition is driven by syntactic struc-
ture, accepting standard arguments for a poverty of the stimulus entails that there
must be some innate syntactic capacity over and above our pragmatic abilities that
is responsible for the semantic composition of morpheme sequences. One can try to
get around this by denying the poverty of the stimulus and arguing that syntactic
structure is a byproduct of cognitive efficiency or learning constraints, but in set-
ting out the theoretical landscape, I will simply assume the generative position that
these arguments are fundamentally misguided.
Earlier, however, I stated that compositionality (and thus syntax) is not an ob-
viously necessary component of the utterance-idea mapping. We can at least imag-
ine a scenario in which shared intentionality at first permits holistic utterances to be
associated with situation-specific pragmatic meanings, with forces in cultural evo-
lution later leading to holistic utterances being associated with abstract concepts,
thus being more recognisable as morphemes with semantics. To get compositional-
ity, an innate syntactic facultywould still need to be added afterwards, as there is no
route from holism to compositionality without it (Tallerman 2007), but still, some
formof utterance semanticsmight have preceded syntactic structure. At heart, what
this claim amounts to is that there is no cognitive, mechanistic difference between
acquiring the purely pragmatic significance of a word like ’hello’ and acquiring
the semantic significance of a word like ’cat’—in both cases, shared intentionality,
mixed with domain-general associative learning mechanisms, are sufficient for the
morphemes to get their meanings, even though these abilities would be insufficient
for morpheme sequences to get compositionalmeanings.
Though this seems admittedly more plausible, I think it has to be false. As
with syntactic structure, the problem is again a poverty of the stimulus, though this
time with the non-self-referential grounding that characterises semantic utterances.
Utterances with pragmatic meanings, like ’hello’, are by their nature identifiable
with the intentions of their users—what their users intend by them on individual
occasions simply is constitutive of their meaning, and associative learning can han-
dle this without issue. However, semantic utterances are more than their intended
use on individual occasions. It is not just that semantic utterances refer to abstract
concepts that are context-independent, but also that their use extends beyond the
conceptual referents to which we are exposed, such that there are cases in which
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it seems implausible to account for the novel use of a word as being a pragmatic
modulation of some meaning that we have observed it to have in a prior instance.
Themost obvious examples aremetaphors. Consider theword, ’open’, for ex-
ample. It has various ordinary uses, as in ’open the door’, ’open the letter’, ’open the
shop’, and ’open thewound’. Each of these uses requires a contextual interpretation—
taking a scalpel to a door would not satisfy the meaning as it would for a wound
(Recanati 2004)—but it superficially seems that there is some highly abstract sense
of ’opening’ that applies to them all. Yet, consider the use of the word in Bellow’s
The Dean’s December, where a dog, barking as if in protest at the limits of its ex-
perience, is imagined to be saying, ’open the universe a little more!’ There is no
difficulty in assigning an interpretation to this unusual use of the word, but what
schematic sense of ’open’ applies equally to this use as it does to all the others?
It seems rather that ’open’ has no core conceptual meaning that is modulated sit-
uationally, but rather that it can refer to entirely novel concepts, so long as these
concepts have a sufficient resemblance to those of previous uses (Carston 2013). If
this is true, then the meaning of a word is strictly speaking not a concept or even
a range of possible concepts, but rather some network of conceptual features that
implicate concepts as more or less likely to be referred to by the word. As these
features and their connection to morphemes is a form of tacit knowledge not sup-
ported by experience, there must be some domain-specific mapping capacity that is
responsible for organising an individual’s lexicon in this way, and this would have
to be an evolutionary discontinuity that post-dates shared intentionality. Exactly
what this lexical capacity consists in is as yet unclear, but in §3 I will consider some
of its broader implications for a Chomskyan theory of syntax. First, however, a few
brief comments are warranted on the overall significance of such a discontinuity.
2.3. The Significance of Discontinuity
In section 2.1, I stated that defining discontinuity as a lack of inheritance is compati-
blewith evolutionary gradualism, so the fact that a discontinuity theory is necessary
should not dishearten those who feel that an adaptive explanation of language ori-
gins is essential. To understand the relation between discontinuity and gradualism
more precisely, we first need to acknowledge that choosing traits to study can be
somewhat artificial if it is not done carefully, as we are led to deconstruct whole,
integrated organisms into collections of interacting parts. Often, we are biased in
this by how we, as humans, have evolved to categorise the things we perceive in
the world, and this need not relate in any informative way to the actual genetic,
developmental and structural organisation of organisms. We therefore tend to end
up with false impressions of traits as being somehow isolated from the rest of the
organism in which they are incorporated, suggesting that they have been targeted
by selection pressures, even though they may be nothing more than non-selected
byproducts of other traits, or ‘spandrels’ (Gould & Lewontin 1979).
The ‘biological’ conception of homology that I discussed in section 2.1 has
tried to counteract these problems by focusing on just those traits that are develop-
mentally individualised, with the expectation that their evolutionary development
will likewise have been independent of much of the rest of the organism (Wagner
2016). However, even if we succeed in identifying such traits, this ontogenetic and
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phylogenetic independence does not eliminate a fundamental reliance that all traits
have upon pre-existing organic material to come into existence at all, and this basic
fact grounds all discontinuities in continuity.
To demonstrate this, it is perhaps unhelpful to search for developmentally in-
dividualised traits, as we know far too little about how language cognition individ-
uates in this way. Instead, we can learn from the similarly messy, integrative trait
of bipedalism. There are many other traits besides bipedalism with longer genetic
histories that had to exist prior to its development—some are obviously necessary
precursors, like having at least two legs, while others are more subtle, like having a
particular configuration of the legs, hips, and spine. All of these traits would have
evolved for their own independent benefits, and none with any foresight for mak-
ing bipedalism inevitable or even possible, but only when they came together in
conspiracy could a rudimentary form of bipedal behaviour be experimented with,
and subsequently refined. In a sense, thoughwe can identify the discontinuous ori-
gin of bipedalism with the narrow window of time in which something resembling
bipedal behaviour began, the possibility of its origin was much more deeply rooted
in the history of life. Every trait has these substrates: Traits that are the basis for
other traits to evolve.
Whenwe identify a trait of interest, then, establishing some vague time for its
origin is only the first step in an explanation of its evolution, and the easiest. True
understanding comes with identifying a trait’s substrates in antecedent species, be-
fore the interactions of variation and selection created it in some primitive form
and then developed it through descent. Of course, all substrates are themselves
traits with their own substrates, each one implicating more and more, until the en-
tire organism and its evolutionary history are involved. Part of the challenge we
face in this is to delineate traits and trait relationships in ways that can elucidate
an organism’s functions and their history. With regards to language evolution, a
useful example is speech physiology. Our species is capable of producing a variety
of speech sounds, and we know from the highly limited abilities of other apes that
this capacity arose as a discontinuity in hominins, but how did its substrates lead
to the possibility of that origin?
The production of speech sounds has many phenotypic and genotypic sub-
strates, minimally and most importantly including the anatomy of the vocal tract
and its integration with fine motor control. Consider, then, a hypothetical sce-
nario in which some hominin ancestor had a vocal tract configured roughly like
that of modern humans, but without the neural integration necessary for any ac-
tual speech-making behaviour. Tattersall (1998) suggests that this is in fact close
to the truth, and macaques provide an intriguing parallel—a study by Fitch et al.
(2016), revising the methods and conclusions of an influential paper by Lieberman
et al. (1969), showed that macaques have vocal tracts that are physically adequate
for a variety of speech sounds, though the monkeys don’t produce any, presum-
ably because of a lack of neural control, rather than motivation. Given a scenario
like this in hominins, we would obviously conclude that the ability for speech was
brought about by modifications to our ancestors’ motor control of the vocal tract.
Thus, the discontinuous origin of one trait—speech—would have been predicated
on underlying continuities in its substrates—vocal tracts andmotor control—which
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underwent a gradually transitioned integration (see Ackermann et al. 2014 for one
such story).
Ultimately, what this means is that it is never quite right to talk of a trait
discontinuity as a discontinuity tout court. All traits are the integration of their
substrates, and all trait continuities are the integration of their substrates’ conti-
nuities. Moreover, as the evolutionary process is enormously conservative—recall
that the average genomic difference between humans and chimpanzees is around
1–2% (Chen & Li 2001)—every discontinuity arises in a context of massive substrate
continuity. It is in this sense that all discontinuities can and should be construed as
special cases of continuity: All are tips of innovation on icebergs of conservation,
with the tip unable to exist without its supporting structure.
Bearing these aspects of discontinuity in mind, Lenneberg’s approach dif-
fered considerably from the one I developed in the previous section, as he regarded
the discontinuity of language in a deliberately trivial way, noting only that every
species is by definition discontinuous with every other, and he felt that the unique
properties of language ought to be explained as much as possible through develop-
mental reorganisations of commonalities (see Boeckx & Longa 2011 for a detailed
discussion of this point from a more modern perspective). Thus, while Lenneberg
did not deny that language is unique among animal communication systems, he
avoided talk of language as an integration of other, independent traits (and espe-
cially the idea that somemight be sui generis), while trying to explain characteristics
like syntactic structure as developmentally complex expressions of widely shared
conceptual capacities for categorisation and differentiation.
Initially, this seems antagonistic to any attempt to isolate a constituent prop-
erty of language and claim it as an evolutionary capstone that brought other traits
together in a new system of linguistic behaviour. However, note how the hypothe-
sised discontinuity in speech described above was behavioural, and predicated on
continuities in traits at the lower anatomical level. Just as was the case in the discus-
sion of homology (and drawing parallels with Marr’s 1982 plan for understanding
the visual system), if we are careful to not mix up different levels of analysis, we
will find that these different approaches to trait evolution are complementary.
By simply identifying a unique behavioural or cognitive feature, we are not
forced to make any claims about it corresponding exactly and exclusively to some
individualised developmental process. It could well be the case that the utterance-
idea mapping, or Merge, is nothing more than a theoretical abstraction that labels a
phenomenon which emerges from our complex biological design, but which has
no encapsulated existence at a physical level. As such, Lenneberg’s program is
crucial for identifying how these sorts of discontinuities can result from gradual
descent with modification. However, just as we mustn’t take ‘biological’ homol-
ogy too far in its obsession with developmental individuation, so we mustn’t do
the same here—if we don’t develop the theoretical abstractions in the first place,
we will not even identify what it is that is to be explained in terms of its physical
implementation. Indeed, approaches that repudiate these abstractions inevitably
have their own; they are just either so mindless or simplistic that they are not seen
for what they are. Of course, our abstractions must be open to significant revision
upon discoveries in neuroscience and developmental biology, but we will end up
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understanding nothing if we pretend that we can understand everything from the
bottom up (Krakauer et al. 2017).
In sum, there is nothing upsetting about discontinuity, and nothing inher-
ently saltational about it, as all trait origins are discontinuities, and all disconti-
nuities have continuous substrates. Moreover, the task I have been engaged in
is specifically the identification of a cognitive discontinuity, independent of any
claims about its developmental organisation. Of course, the real test for such a dis-
continuity, as I will explore in the next sections, comes with actually explaining its
origin. What discontinuity theories of language evolution must do is make clear
what substrates preceded linguistic ability so that it could have had a hominin ori-
gin. As stated previously, there aremany potential varieties of discontinuity theory,
but I will only be concerned with Minimalist ones here.
3. Discontinuity in Minimalism
3.1. The Standard Account
In the context of language evolution, the main attraction of Minimalism—and ad-
mittedly its implausibility to some (e.g., Pinker & Jackendoff 2005)—is its offer of
a clear response to what has been dubbed ‘Darwin’s problem’. This is simply the
question, “how could language have evolved?”, only asked quizzically because we
appear to be dealing with an inconceivably speedy evolution of a biologically com-
plex system. As Lieberman (2015) states, Darwin’s problem does not exist in con-
tinuity theories, which hypothesise an evolution over many millions of years, but
we’ve seen that continuity theories have more serious things to worry about.
Chomsky has also in various places (e.g. Chomsky 2010) referred to this as
Wallace’s problem to emphasise the doubt he shares with Wallace about the mech-
anism of natural selection being able to produce linguistic competence (Wallace
1869). However, Wallace also doubted that natural selection could be responsible
for human hands and hairlessness, so his was not a cogent reflection on the rela-
tionship between human cognitive abilities and evolutionary processes. Ultimately,
whether it’s Wallace arguing incredulously for a guiding divinity or, say, Pinker &
Bloom (1990) flogging adaptationism as an elixir for complex design, too many hy-
potheses about language’s evolution begin with astonishment and then search for
mechanisms that can create astonishing things. I think we are safer starting with
biological properties.
Biologically, then, the core motivation of Minimalism is to narrow the differ-
ence between humans and other animals while maintaining a qualitative separa-
tion in linguistic competence, so that the origin of language can happily fit into the
available time. Ideally, this should be accomplished by some very small genetic
changes with large phenotypic effects, so that there would be no need for incon-
ceivable amounts of mutation and selection. If this were possible, accusations of
fanciful saltationalism would then fall flat.
Linguistically, Minimalism aims to do this by unifying the diverse structural
phenomena that were at the heart of Government and Binding theory (GB), such as
binding relations, case assignment, and argument structure, with more basic prin-
ciples of syntactic derivation. As Hornstein (2009: 7f.) notes, the GB vision of the
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language faculty was internally modular, its phenomena having their own inde-
pendent primitives, and this is a highly suspect property for the language faculty,
as it is unlikely that such modules could have evolved and integrated in so short
a time. Indeed, even over many millions of years, it is difficult to see how these
modules could have developed as basic units of language ability, rather than their
properties being emergent (see Poeppel & Embick 2005 on the ‘mismatch problem’
between the primitives of linguistic theory and cognitive neuroscience).
There are now many approaches within the Minimalist framework, but all
try to stray as little as possible from the StrongMinimalist Thesis, which claims that
all the structural properties of languages are derived from the binary set-forming
operation, Merge, taking lexical items as input, building them into recursive hier-
archical structures while constrained by third factor principles of efficient compu-
tation (Chomsky 2005), before converging at interfaces with the sensorimotor and
conceptual-intentional systems.
Of many expositions, Berwick & Chomsky (2016), hereafter B&C, give a con-
cise summary of how the Strong Minimalist Thesis ought to lend shape to our bio-
logical history:
In some completely unknownway, our ancestors developedhuman con-
cepts. At some time in the very recent past, apparently some time before
80,000 years ago if we can judge from associated symbolic proxies, indi-
viduals in a small group of hominids in East Africa underwent a minor
biological change that provided the operationMerge—an operation that
takes human concepts as computational atoms and yields structured ex-
pressions that, systematically interpreted by the conceptual system, pro-
vide a rich language of thought. These processesmight be computation-
ally perfect, or close to it, hence the result of physical laws independent
of humans. The innovation had obvious advantages and took over the
small group. At some later stage, the internal language of thought was
connected to the sensorimotor system, a complex task that can be solved
in many different ways and at different times.
(Berwick & Chomsky 2016: 87)
Although I ultimately favour Minimalist descriptions of syntactic derivation,
I think this account has some irreparable conceptual flaws, deeply rooted in a certain
view of language that wemust take pains to pick apart. First, though, let me discuss
what is notwrong with this description.
An architecture consisting ofMerge (or something like it), with some interface
and third factor constraints, I fully take for granted. There is no issue with positing
that a minor biological change could have produced Merge (though the talk of its
adaptive benefits is perfunctory), as it is computationally basic. It may be a com-
posite operation of, say, concatenation and labelling (Hornstein & Pietroski 2009),
but, however it is implemented, a capacity to compute recursive set formation is an
all-or-nothing deal.
Of course, a consequence of accepting both that syntax is fully captured by
Merge and that Merge evolved almost instantaneously is that all syntactic phenom-
ena ought to have appeared instantaneously too. At risk of contradicting myself, I
share the doubts about this (e.g., Tallerman 2014), but in a specific weak sense. It
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has been the traditional approach in generative linguistics to have syntactic deriva-
tions fully determine utterance output. This is exemplified by Kayne 1994, where
the Linear Correspondence Axiom was intended to ensure a one-to-one correspon-
dence between the left-to-right sequence of morphemes in an utterance and their
top-down sequence in a syntactic tree (this approach had a notable cross-linguistic
application in Julien 2002). However, it is now common practice, if not universal,
for syntactic derivations to under-determine utterance output, so that many features
of left-to-rightmorpheme sequencesmust be imposed by the sensorimotor systems,
creating many language-particular discrepancies with the underlying syntax. Al-
though this inevitably makes the connection between utterances and syntax more
oblique, so that it is harder to work out what syntax is doing (Anderson 2013), it
means that many traditionally ‘syntactic’ word order phenomena may not be ‘syn-
tactic’, in the sense that they arise aftermental computations have finished and been
spelled out. Thus, the full panoply of traditionally ‘syntactic’ (i.e. word order) phe-
nomena would not have arisen instantaneously withMerge but this is because they
are not due to Merge, in which case they are after all not ‘syntactic’ in the relevant
sense (i.e. computationally derived). The small-print of this Minimalist offering is
that Merge will give you everything, but everything isn’t as much as it used to be.
Also unproblematic is the suggestion that concepts precede language, and the
structures built by Merge are primarily connected to the conceptual system, rather
than the sensorimotor systems. Themost obvious reason for this is that there simply
isn’t any inherent hierarchical structure in utterances, as they are one-dimensional
acoustic or visual strings. We are only able to infer that this structure is supposed to
be represented in utterances, and perhaps form our expressions with prosody that
respects and suggests it, because we have an innate mental prejudice to discover
it, given that utterances map to semantic compositions that are syntactically struc-
tured by necessity. Moreover, while hierarchical structures have clear benefits in a
system of thought, allowing the generation of internally complex ideas, there has
been no convincing demonstration that a non-hierarchically structured signalling
system would be improved by this additional complexity (Számadó & Szathmáry
2006)—unless, of course, it was to represent ideas that already possessed that struc-
ture.
The fact that utterances have syntactic structure only secondarily often creates
a confusion about what exactly linguistic competence is, given that the syntactic
structure of concepts is a precondition for anything we would identify as linguistic
expression. Does this mean that linguistic competence after all cannot be the ability
to map between utterances and ideas, as I have described it, and must instead be
the ability to generate syntactic structures, evenwithout actual or possible external-
isation? While it is undeniable that linguistic structure is rooted in the conceptual
system, it is stubborn to insist that linguistic competence is merely that structure-
building capacity. On the standard Minimalist account, there was a time, however
brief, when hominins had syntactically structured ideas that were not externalised,
as the sensorimotor systems had not yet been integrated, and it would be foolish
to call these intelligent but mute hominins linguistically competent. Allowing for
the possibility that syntax originated in ideas therefore does not affect my state-
ments characterising linguistic ability as the utterance-idea mapping. Competence
is therefore not the same thing as the ‘narrow’ language faculty limned by Hauser
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et al. (2002), which may in any case not be helpfully defined (see especially Boeckx
2013 on this).
Finally, there is mounting evidence that refinement of the sensorimotor sys-
tems, with neural integrations allowing complex acoustic signals and a vocal learn-
ing capacity that far surpasses that of other primates, would have had sufficient
time to evolve, even if the developments were entirely hominin. As stated already,
there is evidence that our vocal tracts were speech-ready long before speech use,
even if not quite so exquisitely (Tattersall 1998), and there appear to be deeply con-
served genetic bases for vocal learning that may find a rapid implementation in the
right circumstances (Pfenning et al. 2014).
Now to the problems. As stated in section 2.3, identifying the trait (Merge)
and the time of its origin (in hominins) is only the easy work of setting the parame-
ters for the question (perhaps the arrival of the Minimalist program over a century
after On the Origin of Species should be a warning to us). What an actual theory of
language evolution needs to do is identify the substrates of the identified trait in
antecedent species to explain how its origin and spread was possible. For the lan-
guage faculty, the substrates that we might identify could be genetic, anatomical,
neurological, cognitive, behavioural, and even cultural. Although it is encourag-
ing that B&C and Boeckx (2017) have attempted to identify a neurological basis for
Merge (for a short review of neuroimaging data also see Friederici, this issue), in or-
der to make it seem less like a bolt from the blue, I think there is still so much to be
said about the computational substrates of the language faculty (again setting aside
their developmental basis as a separate issue) that we don’t yet need to venture into
other territories.
Although Merge would have appeared rapidly, its first interactions would
have been with the conceptual system, and the sensorimotor systems could have
been refined quickly, what seems entirely unreasonable is that Merge’s integration
with the rest of our cognitive faculties had to come for free. Bear in mind, Merge
is not just an operation with some output, it is an operation with very specialised
input (‘conceptual atoms’, which are supposed to be unique to humans), as well as
outputs that have to be interpreted by interfaces with independent cognitive mod-
ules of phonology and semantics.
Even if we can explain how syntactic computation originated in hominins
(ignoring the mystery of its conceptual input), we would still have to account for
the cognitive mechanisms that translate its structures into forms that are intelligible
these other mental systems. For this, it does not matter that the sensorimotor and
conceptual systems are comparatively ancient—syntactic structures are purported
to be generated in a novel autonomous module that these other systems now inter-
face with, so their mechanisms for interpreting syntactic structures must be every
bit as novel as the syntactic process itself. For example, if the meaning of some syn-
tactically structured utterance depends upon interface rules that translate syntac-
tic configurations into logical forms, those translation rules must surely post-date
the origin of syntax. What would it mean to say that the conceptual-intentional
system was able to interpret syntactic structures before there were any such struc-
tures? Did Merge bring its own interface rules, or did the interfaces evolve their
rules independently? Merge is generally thought to be constrained in its deriva-
tions by conceptual impositions like the functional hierarchy, but if Merge is just
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a set-forming operation whose autonomous structures are built for interpretation,
how did the conceptual-intentional system ever come to impose these constraints?
To date, the most prominent answer is only that Merge is not so constrained (e.g.,
Chomsky 2004) and that the interfaces filter out sequences they don’t like. As I will
come to explain more fully, these ad hoc stipulations are the result of an unnatural
severance of a syntax that should be closely intertwined with its semantics.
To make a start at this resolution, let’s return to the three as yet unexplained
hominin discontinuities that the standardMinimalist account proposes. Paraphras-
ing the earlier quotation from B&C, these are (in order of origin):
A. The origin of (some relevant notion of) atomic concepts.
B. The origin of Merge within the conceptual system.
C. The origin of sensorimotor integration with the output of Merge.
Immediately, we can note that this improbable sequence must be incorrect
if all of (A)-(B) are hominin origins and independent of each other. Although lan-
guage, as an autapomorphy, is simply biologically improbable, if (A) does not pre-
dispose a species to (B), and (B) does not (C), it is inconceivable that hominins should
have accrued all of these fortunes while nonhumans have been blessed with none.
Nonetheless, it is basically correct to characterise the language faculty as constituted
somehowof the elements in (A), (B) and (C), and in that order, sowehave two routes
to plausibility: Either these are not all hominin in origin (i.e. other species possess
at least concepts, and perhaps Merge), or these are not independent.
The approach taken in B&C entails that language evolution, though described
in three stages, after all required only two innovations—concepts andMerge—with
sensorimotor integration in some sense inevitable or free (and thus not an indepen-
dent development). What this means is either that sensorimotor integration is so
cheap and valuable after Merge evolves that it is unavoidable, so a species simply
cannot find itself at (B) and not proceed to (C), or the sensorimotor systems have
always had some kind of access to the content of the conceptual system, so that (C)
was not the evolution of lexical andphonological capacities, butwas rather amere re-
finement of sensorimotor physiology to make the externalisation of an unbounded
system of ideas more effective. In either case, for B&C other species cannot have
Merge because its presence is sufficient for its externalisation.
B&C in fact seem to believe that, whatever integration of the sensorimotor
systems was necessary, sensorimotor access to concepts is ancient (and therefore
free, in the sense above), as they take utterances in every species they consider to
be straightforward reflections of conceptual ability (see Tallerman 2014: 208f. for
more discussion of this). This effectively means that they draw an equivalence be-
tween words and concepts, or, more weakly, that they presume conceptual reper-
toires to guarantee lexical ones, so that the lack of words in other animals (which
is undoubted for the reasons given in section 2.2) means that animals have no con-
cepts. They do state (p. 84) that other primates have “conceptual structures”, but
by this they seem to mean that primates can make relational distinctions between
things like actors and actions, singular and plural, without anything like property
categorisations.
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There are bizarre consequences to claiming that animals do not have concepts,
as demonstrated by a discussion of the chimpanzee, Nim, where B&C cite Pettito
(2005: 86f.) before concluding that he had neither words nor concepts:
Chimps, unlike humans, use […] labels in a way that seems to rely heav-
ily on some global notion of association. A chimp will use the same label
apple to refer to the action of eating apples, the location where apples
are kept, events and locations of objects other than apples that happened
to be stored with an apple (the knife used to cut it) […] all simultane-
ously and without apparent recognition of the relevant differences or
the advantages of being able to distinguish among them […] Surpris-
ingly then, chimps do not really have “names for things” […] They have
only a hodge-podge of loose associations with no Chomsky-type inter-
nal constraints or categories and rules that govern them.
(Berwick & Chomsky 2016: 146)
Nim clearly did not use anything in a word-like way, but if the sign he used
was used of eating apples, apple locations, apple actions, apple tools, and so on,
then he likely had the concept of an apple, as that is the only psychological constant
that relates all of these disparate references. However, by allowing him the concept,
we are not compelled to somehow interpret his use of the sign as being intended
to mean APPLE, which I agree is impossible. Rather, his haphazard pragmatics
seem very much like a child at the one-word stage, where single words can repre-
sent complex thoughts that include the referent—for example, doggie for, “there’s a
dog!”, “can I pet the dog?”, and “the dog is biting me!” (Jackendoff & Wittenberg
2014). What Nim lacked may not have been the concept that his trainers wanted
the word to signify, but rather an ability to form systematic associations between
repertoires of concepts and signs, so that he could pass the one-word stage and be-
gin expressing structured ideas in a way that respects things like lexical categories
and functional relations. In other words, this is just what sign-use looks like when
you have concepts and a reasonable pragmatic ability, but no mechanism for form-
ing semantic mappings.
Moreover, just as Nim would have been incapable of mentally represent-
ing his handlers’ intentions, his handlers appear to show a systematic oversight
of Nim’s own intentional competence. As we know chimpanzees to be limited by
their lack of shared intentionality, we can only expect that, even if they have con-
cepts, they must fail to communicate them, as being able to do so requires a degree
of theory of mind that they don’t possess. Indeed, Nim’s behaviour is remarkably
similar to the goal-orientated activity of chimpanzees in the wild, whose behaviour
is highly likely to be structured by competences to categorise objects and properties
in the world as concepts (see Fitch 2017 for more discussion of the false conclusions
that B&C draw from limitations on communication of ideas).
The identity between word and concept that B&C tacitly assume is particu-
larly evident in their conclusion from that same passage:
It appears that chimpanzees are perfect examples of pure “associationist
learners”—what they seem to have are direct connections between par-
ticular external stimuli and their signs. They do not seem to regard the apple
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they see in some mind-dependent way […] Rather, they have stored a list of
explicit, mind-independent associations between objects in the external
world and the ASL signs for them.
(Berwick & Chomsky 2016: 146–147; emphasis added)
Again, rather than Nim using associative intelligence, B&C interpret Nim as
an associative intelligence, his psychology a repository of statistical correlations be-
tween stimuli, with no conceptual understanding of types of objects and events that
he encountered—Nimwas just one of Skinner’s superstitious pigeons in an ape cos-
tume. I in fact agree that Nim stored an explicit list of associations between external
objects and signs (i.e. he had only Hockett’s semantics, not the real deal), but the
portion I italicised is a non-sequitur: Just because Nim was unable to form an as-
sociation between utterances and concepts does not mean that Nim had no such
concepts, as there are cognitive capacities besides having concepts that are neces-
sary to form systematic sensorimotor representations of them. B&C are thus led
to a catastrophic vision of human evolution, with language not just a capacity to
communicate structured ideas, but the primary source of ideas, fundamentally re-
constituting the way that our brains organise and process information:
Human cognoscitive powers provide us with a world of experience, dif-
ferent from the world of experience of other animals.
(Berwick & Chomsky 2016: 86)
Their continued underlying assumption is that utterances across species are a direct
insight into their mental life. All one has to do is listen, and one knows what it is
like to be a bat (see Nagel 1974).
Against these ideas, not only is there substantial empirical evidence that non-
human species have concepts as humans have them (see Hurford 2007 for a com-
prehensive review), it also seems cognitively necessary, in that the same associative
mechanisms that were rejected as a theory of utterance-idea mappings in the rejec-
tion of behaviourism are just as incapable of explaining non-linguistic behaviour—
nonhuman specieswould simply not be capable of their richly structured behaviours
were it not for a capacity for forming mental abstractions of sensory experience.
Dupré (1996) has correctly pointed out that to assume otherwise is to be beholden
to the Cartesian view that there is a gulf between humans and nonhumans, the latter
being unthinking automata.
Importantly, if we are compelled to believe that other species have concepts,
then, as they don’t have words, words and concepts must be fundamentally disso-
ciated, and this dissociation means that B&C must be wrong to think that sensori-
motor access to the conceptual system was cheap or free—if so, animals with even
the most basic conceptual systems should be capable of the most basic meaningful
expressions, and this is not what we find. As explored in section 2.2, despite the
abundance of nonhuman conceptual abilities, the representation of concepts in non-
human utterances isn’t tiny, it’s nil, as it’s impossible. As sensorimotor access to
concepts must be secured by a specific capacity that uniquely evolved in humans,
it’s absolutely essential that we understand the role of Merge in this, as if Merge in
addition to concepts is sufficient for their externalisation, then other animals ought
not to have Merge, but if Merge is genuinely a conceptual tool, and concepts have
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no automatic connection with sensorimotor representation, then Merge might be
found in non-speaking animals.
Though evidence of syntactically structured thought in nonhuman species is
slim, and we perhaps don’t even know how to confirm or deny it convincingly, it
would arguably be a parsimonious outcome, as other animals could be said to pos-
sess the sorts of ideas thatMerge can generate (taking concepts rather thanwords as
input), and many species seem capable of mentally representing relationships like
whodidwhat towhom, with the kinds of argument structures that are secured by a hi-
erarchical syntax (see Carruthers 2002 and Gallistel 2011 for discussion). What pre-
vents them from having the same cultural and symbolic intelligence would there-
fore not be a lack of Merge, but a lack of an ability to externally represent what
Merge generates, so that they could acquire more complex conceptual structures
by building a shared lexicon (Tallerman 2009). Likewise, what caused the flourish-
ing of symbolic behaviour in human societies around 100,000 years ago may not
have been our species’ acquisition of Merge, but rather our acquisition of a capacity
to express its structures. Of course, if feasible, this would also be attractive within
the Minimalist aesthetic, as it would reduce the chasm between humans and other
species, while still maintaining some domain-specific linguistic capacity.
Arguably, a keymotivation for B&C to hold to their position is that if we allow
Merge to exist without externalisation, it is more literally a device for structuring
thoughts than they ever intended, as syntax could no longer be understood as a fully
autonomous module facilitating interaction between the performance systems—
Merge would just build ideas, and whatever maps those ideas to utterances is a
mystery again. Although the hierarchical structure of utterances and ideas would
be as central to linguistic competence as ever, narrow syntax would be gone, and, as
hinted at twice already, much of what we previously believed to be determined by
mental computations would instead be effects of externalisation processes. In the
remainder of this paper, I will briefly outline some ideas that lend support from a
more linguistic perspective.
3.2. There’s Minimalism and then There’s Minimalism
If it is true that Merge has no necessary connection to utterances and can exist in
many species purely to structure ideas, then there is no prior reason for the objects
it derives to feature elements or relationships that have no semantic interpretation.
Moreover, though syntax might in the end be imperfect and generate some things
that are not semantically interpreted, none of its redundancies should be coinci-
dentally targeted for sensorimotor legibility. For example, in a standard T-model
of the language faculty, syntax may undertake a movement operation to ensure the
left-to-right order of words in an utterance. However, if this movement operation
has no purpose at logical form, it ought to be prohibited from syntax and the dis-
placement explained by externalisation mechanisms (see Tallerman 2014 for some
possibilities).
This suggests a broader research program to demonstrate that Merge can in-
deed exist as a conceptual device with no necessary sensorimotor connection, or, in
other words, to demonstrate that Merge only needs and uses atomic concepts in-
stead of lexical items (see Burton-Roberts & Poole 2006 for some reasons why this
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undertaking is attractive for reasons independent of the arguments presented here).
Whereas the Minimalist program proffers the Strong Minimalist Thesis, claiming
that Merge is an optimal solution to the needs of two interfaces with the perfor-
mance systems, we can test what I will call, only half-facetiously, the Minimalist
Minimalist Thesis, which claims thatMergemeets only the needs of semantics, with
all utterance phenomena that are not reducible to the derivation of a logical form
being explained by externalisation pressures imposed upon completed derivations.
Testing this properly is beyond this paper, but it has some initial promise.
We can approach the core issues by thinking about the ways in which syntac-
tic structure can relate to semantics. If what we are after is some kind of equivalence
between syntax and semantics, then it is immediately tempting to reconsider gener-
ative semantics, but I take it that that paradigm failed for good reasons (Newmeyer
1980). However, we should bear in mind that the fault with generative semantics
may not have been its proposal that semantics should be homomorphic with syn-
tax, but rather that it attempted its homomorphism pre-derivationally. Let us think
about various possible derivational relations, then:
1. Configurational interpretation
2. Rule-to-rule interpretation
3. Piggybacking
4. Derivational equivalence
The first two terms are due to Bach (1976). In a configurational system, Bach
says, interpretative rules take “a [syntactic] structure of such and such a form [and]
translate the structure into an expression in the interpreted language of such and
such a form” (Bach 1976: 184). In such a system, rules of arbitrary complexity map
completed syntactic structures onto logical forms, with any input suitable for any
output. Although this sounds unconstrained, limits are of course imposed by ex-
planatory elegance and it has perhaps been the most common approach.
There is some variation in what rule-to-rule interpretation is supposed to
mean, but the interpretative rules ought to be in some sense less arbitrary, with
every application of some well-defined syntactic rule having a direct semantic con-
sequence. Lohndal (2014) develops a version of this where every cyclical Spell-Out
of syntactic structure creates a conjunct in a neo-Davidsonian semantics (Davidson
1967, Pietroski 2005). Conversely, this means that every conjunct in a logical form
ought to correspond to a Spell-Out domain.
What I call ‘piggybacking’ is just a special type of rule-to-rule interpretation
that is maximally transparent. For this, every syntactic operation ought to have
an immediate logical interpretation. One such system is developed by Hornstein
& Pietroski (2009), where Merge (renamed Combine) is first decomposed into the
structure-building operations Concatenate and Label, and then all concatenations
signify conjunction of monadic concepts, and all labelling signifies the building of
thematic relationships.
These three approaches are all interpretative: Syntax first creates a structure
on its own and, however soon afterwards, translation rules apply to that structure
to create a logical form. However, abandoning any notion that the output of Merge
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must interface with a sensorimotor system means that having an independent syn-
tacticmodulewith just a semantic interface is unmotivated. Such an interface is only
substantive when there is a many-to-one relationship between syntactic structures
and logical forms, which is what we find in architectures where syntax takes lexical
items (not concepts) as input, with that relationship holding of cross-linguistic dif-
ferences in utterances that express synonymies. However, if atomic concepts are the
input to syntax and, by extension, the syntactic process is not affected by its input,
then there must be a one-to-one correspondence between structure and meaning,
making an ‘interface’ vacuous. In essence, separating syntax from semantics is only
credible if syntax takes input with non-semantic features, or in some other way in-
terfaceswith non-semantic systems. Especially given the possibility for there to be a
maximal rule-to-rule correspondence between operations in syntax and semantics,
if syntax has no necessary connection to any other cognitive faculties, then syntactic
rules simply are semantic rules, and the two are derivationally equivalent.
Having talked about ‘syntax’ now inmany differentways, a concrete example
may help illustrate these points. Consider the utterance in (8), the simplified syntac-
tic structure in (9), and the logical form in (10) (for the purposes of this discussion,
we do not need a precise theory of the functional sequence, so I do not specify all
functional heads):
(8) Brutus stabs Caesar.
(9) T
Brutus T
–s F3
<Brutus> F3
F3 F2
Caesar F2
F2 V
stab
(10) 9e[stab(e) & THEME(e, Caesar) & AGENT(e, Brutus) & PRES(e)]
The claim of the Minimalist Minimalist Thesis is that Merge, taking concepts
as input, is directly responsible for the derivation of (10). That is, the logical form is
not created by an interpretation of a previously built syntactic structure; the logical
form is a syntactic structure, from which the utterance ‘Brutus stabs Caesar’ ought
to be derived. As such, the representation in (9) is equivalent to (10) to the extent
that what it represents is also represented in (10), and whatever other features (9)
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has that correspond only to the utterance (e.g., agreement and possibly movement)
need to be explained as artefacts of externalisation—they are not genuine features
of a syntactic derivation.
While the transparency between syntactic and semantic forms means that
syntactic trees as normally drawn contain morpho-phonological information that
is not truly part of syntax, we ought nevertheless to recognise richer structure in
logical forms. To reiterate, I argue that logical forms themselves are produced by
derivation, not by interpretation of prior derivations, so logical forms have deriva-
tional histories due to Merge, making them recursive hierarchical trees. Though
that may not be clear from the appearance of (10), we can give it a better represen-
tation:
(11) PRES(e)
AGENT(e, __)
Brutus THEME(e, __)
Caesar e
stab
Although this looks simpler than the earlier syntactic tree, it contains the same
structural, functional information and, in amore developed theory, should be suffi-
cient to determine externalisation. Readers may notice that (11) strongly resembles
Brody’s (2000) Mirror theoretic representations of syntactic structures, which he ar-
gues for from entirely different motivations. In that system, (9) would look like
this:
(12) –s
Brutus F3
<Brutus> F2
Caesar V
stab
Clearly somequestions immediately arise, presuming that a system likeHorn-
stein & Pietroski (2009) can indeed establish a derivational equivalence between
these semantic and syntactic forms: What exactly is the relation between the func-
tional heads and the thematic roles (Borer 2005b, for example, replaces these the-
matic roles with ones that specify event structure)? How might movement be mo-
tivated at the sensorimotor interface, so that Brutus is linearised as the specifier of
Tense? And is it possible to dispense with other canonical syntactic relations, like
specifier-head-complement order, feature-valuing andvariable argument structure?
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It should be noted, of course, that syntactically structured logical forms un-
dermine any potential objection that they are not suitable for externalisation, as
such objections fail to treat logical forms as inherently structured. For example, one
might say that because conjunction is commutative—AGENT& THEME = THEME
&AGENT—pronunciation order is impossible to determine. However, as a seman-
tic derivation byMerge has a temporal history and is constrained in its construction
by whatever usually constrains Merge, like the functional hierarchy (Cinque 1999,
Ramchand & Svenonius 2014), the proper shape for a derived logical form is the
one in (11), which is suitable for linear ordering.
The most obvious difficulty for these ideas is that Merge taking atomic con-
cepts, rather than lexical items, as input means that every identical meaning across
languages ought to have an identical syntactic representation despite massive sur-
face variation. One could argue that, once concepts have been connected with
words,Merge could take feature-rich lexical items as input instead of concepts. This
is essentially what Chomsky claims (with the presumption that the connection to
words came for free), as he argues that Merge began with concepts, though the en-
tire basis of parameterised language acquisition according to the Borer-Chomsky
conjecture (Baker 2008) is that the input to syntax can bemarkedwith syntax-affect-
ing features (thus, they must be lexical items, rather than concepts, which do not
bear such features). However, I believe this defeat can be avoided if we consider
what it means to get rid of the lexical and morpho-phonological features that are
normally associated with the lexical input to syntax.
In mainstream Minimalism, the secondary nature of externalisation is usu-
ally taken to mean that syntax is blind to morpho-phonological features, if they are
present at all, though parameterised syntactic features are of course only possible if
there are sensorimotor forms from which they can be inferred during acquisition.
In other words, syntactic features are properties of lexical items that index concepts;
they are not properties of concepts themselves. However, if concepts do not auto-
matically entail lexical items, this system faces a fundamental problem, as the syn-
tactic process at the time before externalisation either has unvalued features that
cannot be valued, or if it can get by without feature-valuing, the origin of features
and a sensitivity to them is unexplained. This much suggests that we should be
aiming to get rid of non-semantic features if we believe that morpho-phonological
features are irrelevant to syntax, but we need to approach the issue from another
direction to really substantiate this.
Exo-skeletal (XS) syntax, following (Borer 2005a,b), has in the past ten years
had great success with undermining the traditional view that syntactic structure
projects from lexical specifications (with, for example, argument structure being li-
censed by features on verbs specifying how many and which theta-roles they must
assign). Instead, XS syntax develops a frameworkwhere structure is templatic, uni-
versal, and (in a T-model) imposed upon lexical items, with meaning turning out to
be variously acceptable, coerced or unacceptable (oftenwith semantic unacceptabil-
ity better explaining ‘ungrammaticality’). Moreover, there are programmatic rea-
sons for wanting to do away with lexical features even without pursuing a deriva-
tional semantics (e.g., Boeckx 2015), and there is interesting work being done to
reformulate phenomena like case assignment in terms of structural configurations
rather than feature-valuing (e.g., Preminger 2014).
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For now, if we take it for granted that lexical features can be dispensedwith, it
becomes much more difficult to do away with morpho-phonological ones, and it is
seriously tempting to conclude from studies like Borer (2013) that syntax is simply
not possible without morpho-phonological input leading derivations, which seems
counter to the basic intuition that syntactic structure is the structure of ideas. Per-
haps we will one day have to concede that syntactically structured thoughts were
only possible once spoken communication provided a means of organising concep-
tual structure, but this is an extraordinary claim requiring extraordinary evidence.
The main obstacle to reconciling XS syntax with a derivational semantics is
the very clear mismatch between the units of morphology and units of meaning.
In particular, basic (i.e. non-composed) meanings are sometimes matched with al-
ready syntactically structured words and word sequences, so the apparently nec-
essary conclusion that has been reached by Borer is that morphemes are the true
atomic input to syntax, with super-morphemic Spell-Out domains triggering con-
ceptual access. This moreover means quite strikingly that morphemes (or ‘roots’)
as listed in the lexicon are not associated with conceptual content, as they acquire it
only when integrated within functional structure.
Of course, this must all be turned on its head tomaintain the claims that other
species have Merge, and that Merge structures concepts alone, and the only way to
do this is to challenge the belief central to most syntactic theory that syntactic termi-
nals correspond to actual or possible morphological units. With the morphology-
concept mismatch, if concepts are to be the input to syntax, then syntactic terminals
must be in many cases larger or smaller than morphemes, and morphemes must in
many cases be externalisations of multiple terminals. This novel approach has had
its first explorations in ‘spanning’ (Svenonius 2016), an outgrowth of Nanosyntax
(Starke 2009) and Distributed Morphology (Halle & Marantz 1993), although these
approaches still retain language-specific elements as the input to syntactic compu-
tation, rather than human-universal conceptual atoms.
To end this sketch, I would like to offer a metaphor for envisioning exactly
the kind of system that is required, as technical implementations could have many
guises, and the real sticking point here is what the input to syntactic computation
must be. Especially as Chomsky already regularly claims that syntactic deriva-
tion is optimised for semantic interpretation, how is any of the preceding discus-
sion genuinely different from his proposals? It is the input that matters, as syn-
tactic analysis since the earliest days of generative grammar has always assumed,
to a greater or lesser degree, an isomorphism between syntactic terminals and the
morpho-phonological units of particular languages, whereas it is essential to this
system that syntactic terminals are the atomic concepts that can enter into syntactic
composition, which are universal for all speakers of all languages (and such con-
cepts must exist if concepts and their composition are prior to linguistic ability). In
other words, the ‘lexical item’, defined as a conjunction of phonological, syntactic,
and semantic content, has no basis in the theory. Yet, if syntactic structures are so
regularised, and if they do not structuremorphemes, how is language variation pos-
sible? Note that frameworks like Distributed Morphology (Halle & Marantz 1993),
which posit the phonological emptiness of syntactic roots, are not answers to this,
as they still claim that roots are language-particular, and thus the invisibility of the
phonology is sleight of hand.
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Let’s address this by asking quite simply: How do morphemes get their syn-
tax if not from Merge, which is said to structure only concepts, prior to any mor-
phological representation? Imagine first of all that you are a child again, and, pre-
suming that your childhood was at all like mine, that you’re on a school trip to the
woods. You have in your hands a sheet of paper and awax crayon, and youwalk up
to a tree, hold the paper against the trunk, and rub the crayon across the sheet. What
you now hold in your hand is a two-dimensional picture of the three-dimensional
trunk that was underneath. Of course, even though it is two-dimensional, there is
sufficient contrast in light and depth of colour that you can look at it and accurately
reconstruct an idea of how the tree must have been. It is a property of our visual
systems, as with any painting or photograph, that we can look at a two-dimensional
object and see it as three-dimensional. However, just because your tree rubbing has
the appearance of three-dimensionality to you, you do not conclude that it must
have been produced by a three-dimensional process. Whatever constructed the
tree’s trunk from carbon and nutrients in the soil did not construct your picture
from the wax crayon. You placed against the tree an independent interface, and
applied a different substance to represent the tree in lesser dimensions.
In the mental woodlands of our language faculty, we have syntactic trees,
which are logical forms constituted of concepts, that are two-dimensional, and some-
how they correspond to sequences of morphemes. Of course, when we produce
an acoustic signal, the signal is entirely one-dimensional, though we are capable
of identifying the two-dimensional mental object that it represents. Perceiving this
correspondence, however, does notmean that the substance of the one-dimensional
representation must be brought into sequence by the same process that is responsi-
ble for the two-dimensional structure it represents. Instead, it is perfectly possible
that the two-dimensional object has a prior, independent existence, and the func-
tion of language—the utterance-idea mapping—is to hold up a one-dimensional
interface against that structure and cover it with morpho-phonological substance
in ways that are highly variable across languages. This would in part explain why
it is that words do not straightforwardly associate with concepts, and it would ulti-
mately support the view of Fodor (1998) that language is a non-compositional rep-
resentation of a compositional Mentalese. It would moreover defuse the criticisms
of Fodor’s position in Pietroski 2006, as there would be no second morpho-syntax
to account for, independent of the syntax of Mentalese—the structure of morpheme
sequences comes not from a syntactic operation, but from an externalisation mod-
ule. There are of course many intricacies in cross-linguistic variation that it would
take detailed study to reconcile with these suggestions, but it seemsmore andmore
that independent developments in pragmatics, semantics, and syntax are converg-
ing to make this a possibility worth serious attention.
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